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Pre-emptive Strikes

As 1813 began, the military events of 1812 played a major role in the plans developed by both sides for the upcoming campaign season. To the American government, its previous military defeats were embarrassments, but ones that could be rectified by the provision of future victories. On the other hand, the loss of the Territory of Michigan to the authority of the British Crown as part of the surrender at Detroit was a political disaster that almost toppled the administration and was looked on as a stain upon the national pride of the United States.

Furthermore, following Hull’s surrender, reports accumulated of Native warriors from the British alliance robbing and attacking wounded or sick American soldiers, terrorizing civilians, and looting isolated homes. Although these reports also repeatedly documented that whenever they were around, the British troops and their officers tried to restrain or prevent these depredations, these details of fact were not allowed to mitigate the political advantage these events gave to the War Hawks in calling for a massive retaliatory expansion of the American war effort.

One particularly vehement congressman, Henry Clay, stated:

Canada innocent? Canada unoffending? Is it not in Canada that the tomahawk of the savage has been moulded into its death-like form? Has it not been from Canadian magazines, Malden [Amherstburg] and others, that these supplies have been issued? Supplies which have enabled the savage hordes to butcher the garrison of Chicago and to commit other horrid murders? Was it not by the joint co-operation of Canadians and Indians that a remote American fort Michilimackinac, was assailed and reduced while in ignorance of war? What does this war represent? The united energies of one people arrayed against the combined energies of another![1]

North of the border, Sir George Prevost, the senior British commander, also saw this ceding as a worst-case scenario. Only from his point of view, his troops’ occupation of Michigan would become a cause that would unite the chronically divided political cabals in Washington, and precipitate a major backlash of American public opinion in favour of the continuation of the war. Despite his personal desire to withdraw his military forces back across the Detroit River and hand the territory back to American control, the need to maintain the vital Native support in preserving Upper Canada effectively forced Prevost to maintain the occupation. On the other hand, he was just as determined not to send any of his extensive reserves of troops or supplies west into Upper Canada, or beyond, to bolster the British positions; instead, his principal focus of protecting and maintaining Lower Canada and the Maritime colonies remained paramount.

At the same time, Prevost’s local commander, Colonel Henry Proctor, was in a no-win situation. Isolated at the far end of a tenuous and intermittent supply line with a miniscule force of worn-out regular troops and a militia of varying degrees of enthusiasm and loyalty, Proctor was expected to not only defend his frontier in Upper Canada, but also occupy, control, and defend a huge new undefined border against the threat of American military retaliation. He was also responsible for maintaining an alliance with an unreliable and constantly changing balance of power within the Native nations, who demanded he uphold their claims on the newly occupied territory; not to mention supply their warriors and dependents with their every need in food and supplies. At the same time, he had inherited a huge region of American territory, occupied by potentially or actively hostile civilian settlers who demanded his protection against the hostilities of his Native allies. Finally, he had reliable intelligence that the U.S. military were indeed preparing a large expeditionary force to retake Michigan, Detroit, and press on into Upper Canada.

As a result, he recognized that if he maintained his extended positions, he could not possibly hold out against an American counter assault. On the other hand, if he retreated it would mean abandoning Michigan’s civilian populace to probable escalating Native violence; while at the same time alienating those same Natives as being an abandonment of his treaty obligations. This, in turn, would threaten their further support of the British war effort and make them more likely to commit the very atrocities he was desperate to prevent in the first place.

THE BATTLE OF THE RIVER RAISIN

(FRENCHTOWN), January 22, 1813

Matters came to a head in early January 1813, when a force of over 6,300 American troops of the “Northwestern Army” under Indiana Governor Major General William H. Harrison began their campaign to retake the Michigan Territory and Detroit. With this task completed, they were then to cross the ice on the Detroit River and capture Amherstburg before marching up the Thames River Valley to attack Burlington Heights and the Niagara frontier from the rear (west). Facing this force, Proctor’s official roster of regular troops for the whole frontier consisted of some 12 officers and 367 other ranks, of which 114 were detached as the garrison at Detroit. His available militia forces were an unknown factor, as it would depend on how many actually responded to a call to arms. Finally, his Native allies were proving to be less and less co-operative, as many warriors had angrily abandoned the frontier in response to hearing of Sir George Prevost’s temporary armistice with the Americans at the end of the previous year.

Because of the huge logistical difficulties of engaging in a winter campaign, the American force advanced in three separate columns. Unfortunately, due to weather and transportation difficulties, inter-column communications soon broke down and the individual units in each column became strung out along their line-of-march. As a result, the isolated advance elements of the column under Brigadier General James Winchester reached the Maumee River Rapids on January 10th, well ahead of the remainder of their force. Despite having little in the way of proper winter clothing, suffering from malnutrition, disease, frostbite, and poor morale, the 1,300 men of the column still posed a significant threat to Proctor’s small detachment of militia and Natives stationed at Frenchtown (Monroe, MI), some thirty-five miles (56 kilometers) away. Eighteen miles (29 kilometers) further on, at Amherstburg, Proctor was notified of this American threat and issued orders for his troops to prepare for action.

At Brigadier General Winchester’s headquarters, confident that Major General Harrison was forwarding reinforcements to his position, Winchester authorized the seizure of Frenchtown by a detachment of 500 Kentucky militia. Augmented on the march to around 700 men, the Americans made their attack in three separate columns over the frozen River Raisin late in the afternoon of January 18th. Awaiting them were an alerted detachment of two small companies of Essex County Militia under the command of Major Ebenezer Reynolds, totalling only around fifty men, but supported by a small artillery howitzer and between 200 to 300 Native warriors.[2]

After an initial exchange of fire, the Americans advanced and outflanked the British position, forcing the defenders to make a fighting retreat into the woods, inflicting an estimated loss of twelve killed and fifty-five wounded on the Americans, for a loss on the defender’s part of fifteen warriors killed, one militiaman wounded, and two militiamen and a warrior captured.[3] Having gained a victory, the American force occupied the village and were soon reinforced by the arrival of General Winchester with a further 250 regular troops. However, in occupying Frenchtown, Winchester made little subsequent effort to make the position more secure from a potential enemy attack — a failure that was to cost him and his men dearly in the days to come.

Informed of the American attack at 2:00 a.m. on January 19th, Colonel Proctor was concerned that additional American forces were moving to support Winchester’s advance. He therefore moved quickly, trusting in the advantage of the moment to hit back at the enemy while their forces were divided. Leaving Amherstburg at dawn on January 20th, before all of the available militia units had arrived, his combined force of around 1,200 men made a forced march undetected by the enemy and were in striking range by the night of the 21st.

Before dawn on the 22nd, Proctor’s troops were in position only a matter of two hundred yards (183 meters) from the unprepared American camp and began their final approach. Inside the camp, the normal daily morning call to reveille was almost immediately followed by the sounds of muskets being fired by the American sentries, who saw their enemy forming up for the attack. However, instead of advancing immediately with his entire force against a surprised and unprepared enemy, Proctor ordered his artillery to open fire in reply and held back the infantry. As a result, the otherwise shocked American troops were given time to react and form up. However, not having prepared any defences, the Americans were forced to fight where they stood. During the next hour, the battle fluctuated across the frozen fields and among the buildings of Frenchtown, with the American artillery and Kentucky militias at the American centre inflicting heavy casualties within the centre of the British line. On the flanks the scene was even more chaotic, as the British Native allies and militias pressed home their attacks until they eventually broke through to the American rear. At that point the American flank positions began to crumble, with men scrambling to cross the frozen River Raisin. What followed was a rout that saw the Native warriors take full advantage of the heat of battle to exact revenge on the fleeing American troops, particularly men of the Kentucky militias. As a result, nearly four hundred were killed and an unrecorded number were listed as missing. Some American newspaper accounts even went so far as to claim that of a thousand men involved, only thirty-three evaded death or capture to return to their homes.

Among the prisoners captured was Brigadier General James Winchester, who was subsequently handed over to Colonel Proctor. Following a number of acrimonious exchanges about the respective excesses of the Native and Kentucky forces, Proctor and Winchester finally hammered out an agreement of surrender for those troops still holding out in a fortified blockhouse. Despite having achieved a stunning victory, over five hundred American prisoners then had to be fed, guarded, and protected from further Native attacks by Proctor’s limited number of non-Native troops, which itself had been reduced through battle casualties by over two hundred men.

Following the battle, prisoner’s claims that Major General Harrison and his column were only a matter of hours away persuaded Proctor that he had no realistic option but to retreat to Amherstburg with his able-bodied prisoners. However, without sufficient sleighs to carry both the British and American wounded, and believing Harrison’s forces would be there within a matter of hours to tend to them, Proctor made the fateful decision to leave around sixty American wounded in the hospital and buildings at Frenchtown.

What was not known at the time was that Harrison’s army was still more than forty miles away, nearly two days march. Shortly after noon on January 22nd, the British evacuated Frenchtown with their prisoners, arriving at Amherstburg shortly after midnight. There they were greeted by a jubilant crowd that applauded the victors, but who also had to be restrained from assaulting the Kentucky militia prisoners, who had been responsible for extensive looting and atrocities during the initial invasion of Upper Canada the previous summer. So violent were the feelings against these men that Prevost felt that although officially they could be paroled, their unarmed release on the Detroit frontier could imperil their lives at the hands of both the local citizenry and Native warriors alike. He therefore ordered their being marched, along with the captured regulars and General Winchester, to the Niagara frontier for parole and subsequent release; while the general and the regulars continued on to the prison hulks at Quebec.

Meanwhile, hearing of Winchester’s defeat, Harrison abandoned his advance and ordered a retreat back to the Maumee Rapids. After destroying Winchester’s stockpile of supplies and making no attempt to determine the enemy’s location or intentions, he continued his retreat to the Sandusky River, leaving the wounded Americans at Frenchtown abandoned and defenceless when, on the morning of January 23, 1813, a force of over two hundred Native warriors, unencumbered by any British or white restraints, descended on the village. They then began to rob the wounded Americans of their clothing, tomahawked any who were unable to move, herded the walking wounded out into the freezing air in little more than their shirtsleeves, and set fire to the buildings. What followed was a “death march” as around four or five dozen hapless prisoners were marched off into captivity, with any who faltered being summarily executed.

Hearing of this atrocity, Colonel Proctor and his subordinates made strenuous efforts to locate and ransom these prisoners. However, the political damage had been done. Even when American survivors subsequently testified that there had been no involvement, collusion, or even presence of British troops at the event, the fact that Colonel Proctor was subsequently promoted to the rank of Brigadier General, coupled with fictitious accounts and vitriolic cartoons showing smiling British troops and their officers standing by as the massacre occurred, filled the pages of American papers for months to come. The event even became a rallying cry, as “Remember the Raisin” entered the American lexicon of famous sayings related to the War of 1812.

Once again an American invasion had been thwarted, although at a long-term cost of raising the level of American determination to recover their lost territories and continue the war. In the short-term, however, it had the effect of making the American administration, and its new appointee to the position of secretary of war, Major General John Armstrong, wary of conducting operations at such a remote distance from its centre of supplies and logistics. Instead, Armstrong looked at pursuing the main American spring campaign at points along the St. Lawrence River, Lake Ontario, and on the Niagara frontier. Unfortunately for the American plans, the British forces on the St. Lawrence corridor had other ideas on that score.

THE RAID ON OGDENSBURG,

FEBRUARY 22, 1813

From the outset of the war, the fact that the St. Lawrence River was being the single line of transport into Upper Canada had been a significant weakness in the British war effort. However, despite this obvious fact, the Americans made little real effort to dominate the waterway when war was first declared. In fact, apart from some initial skirmishes between gunboats, the only real cross-border incident came when the Americans made a sortie on Gananoque, just to the east of Kingston, on September 21, 1812.

However, the potential threat level rose in early October, when a force of the First Rifle Regiment under Captain Benjamin Forsyth and several companies of New York State militia under Brigadier General Jacob Brown were sent from Sackets Harbor to garrison the small community of Ogdensburg, directly opposite the British fortifications at Prescott. Up to this point, the civilian populace of Ogdensburg had maintained a friendly and highly profitable neutrality with their “enemy” by supplying cattle and other food to the Prescott garrison. This communication was now halted and British boats were fired on as they plied the water of the river.

In retaliation, the garrison at Prescott, under Colonel Robert Lethbridge, attempted to mount an attack against Ogdensburg on Sunday, October 4, 1812. Because Lethbridge made no effort to disguise his preparations, the British intentions were clearly telegraphed to the Americans, allowing the Ogdensburg garrison of around 1,200 men to be fully prepared when the attack commenced. As the British boats approached the enemy shore, they came under heavy American artillery and musket fire, which inflicted significant damage on the vessels and casualties amongst the tightly packed men. Unable to sustain the attack, the assault collapsed, to the humiliation of the British and the added prestige of the American military commanders. In response, Colonel Lethbridge was replaced by a far more experienced combat officer, Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Pearson (23rd Regiment), who undertook to bring the garrison at Prescott up to a proper state of battle readiness and made detailed plans for the destruction of Ogdensburg. Unfortunately, Prevost’s non-aggression directives vetoed any immediate retaliation.

Detail from a map showing the fortifications at Prescott. What was later named Fort Wellington is at centre right, while a small stockaded military compound lies just to the left (west).

Library and Archives Canada, NMC, C-24808.

With the New Year little seemed to have changed, as the uneasy stalemate of truce continued. However, at the beginning of February Captain Forsyth received reports that a number of American troops were being held and mistreated in the jail at Elizabethtown (Brockville). Without verifying the information, and against general orders, Forsyth organized a raiding party consisting of around two hundred U.S. riflemen, supported by Ogdensburg militiamen under Colonel Thomas Benedict. Crossing the frozen St. Lawrence River undetected on the night of February 6–7th, the Americans swept down on the detachment of Leeds County Militia garrisoning the post, capturing them almost without a shot being fired. Releasing the few prisoners that they found in the jail cells, the Americans then arrested a number of local citizens to add to the twenty or so militiamen already captured and returned to the Ogdensburg with over fifty prisoners, one hundred twenty muskets, twenty rifles, two casks of ammunition, and several barrels of food.[4] As far as Colonel Pearson was concerned, this escalation in enemy activities only confirmed his determination that the American position at Ogdensburg needed to be permanently neutralized as soon as possible. However, as he could not contravene Sir George Prevost’s injunction against engaging in offensive warfare, he sought to gain the appropriate approvals.

Only days later, on February 21st, and to the surprise of everyone, Sir George Prevost himself arrived at Prescott, accompanying a supply column of sleighs. His mission, taken in the depth of winter, was no casual journey; instead it was being made as an urgently needed measure to quell the growing criticism of General Sheaffe’s administration of Upper Canada. In addition, Prevost wanted to make a personal assessment of Sheaffe’s plan to completely revise the militia system of Upper Canada and establish a series of full-time militia units, including a troop of Provincial Light Cavalry, a troop of Provincial Artillery Drivers, battery companies of Provincial artillery, and, most importantly, three battalions of a new “Incorporated” Militia infantry.

Discussing the current American offensive activities, Prevost heard out Colonel Pearson’s request to attack Ogdensburg, but replied by reaffirming his position that no offensive actions were to take place that might disturb the status quo with the Americans. Prevost also notified Colonel Pearson that he was transferring him to Kingston to take over command of that important post, as part of the reorganization Prevost was undertaking among the upper echelon military command in Upper Canada. Pearson’s replacement, Major “Red” George Macdonell, of the Glengarry Light Infantry, was appointed effective immediately — as Pearson would be accompanying Prevost when he left the following morning.

Conscious that the Americans had probably received intelligence of his arrival with the supply column and might attack the convoy, Prevost chose to leave early in the morning and without fanfare. As a diversion, Major Macdonell was directed to exercise and parade his troops on the ice-covered St Lawrence River — a practice well established by the British once the weather had created this natural parade ground.

Following orders, Macdonell turned out the garrison for the “demonstration” at dawn. However, once the convoy of sleighs was well on its way, instead of recalling the troops and dismissing his men, Macdonell decided to implement the plan of attack previously developed by Colonel Pearson and take his chances over the official reaction. Forming his force into two columns around 7:00 a.m., Macdonell ordered his men to advance in rapid time across the intervening span of the river to attack Ogdensburg and the hopefully unprepared American garrison.*[5]

Two views from the 1813 earthen ramparts of Fort Wellington at Prescott. The existing central blockhouse is a post-war construction. The far bank, beyond the St. Lawrence River, is the United States, clearly indicating the fort’s strategic position in controlling waterborne traffic upon the river.

On the American side of the river no serious consideration had been given to mounting an attack on Prevost or the convoy, and in keeping with the bitterly cold weather only the sentries were outside, manning their lonely and frigid duty posts. As the light of day improved, the sight of the British troops parading up and down on the river ice below their fort was nothing out of the ordinary and therefore elicited no immediate sense of alarm. However, this calm was soon shattered as the two strong enemy columns rapidly closed upon the American positions. Hearing the alarm sounded by the sentries, the Americans scrambled to dress and man their positions before they were overrun.

The “Stockade Barracks” at Prescott. Built in 1810, this house was taken over by the military at the start of the war and subsequently saw service as a regimental barracks, food and clothing storehouse, and military hospital.

Out on the river, the main (left) British column, under Major Macdonell, looked to reach land and move around the village in order to press their attack on the American vulnerable right (northeast) flank. Moving with only minor difficulty through some shallow snowdrifts, and under relatively light fire, the infantry in this column reached the American shore in time to see the sentries beating a hasty retreat through the village. Without waiting for his artillery support, which was having a more difficult and slower crossing, Macdonell led his men through the streets, rapidly quelling any signs of opposition from enemy troops and civilians hiding in the buildings. They also overran the artillery positions stationed on that side of the community.

Meanwhile, Captain John Jenkins’ (right) column encountered snowdrifts along the American shoreline that hampered the advance of the infantry and entirely blocked the close support of the artillery pieces on sleighs. Moving down the frozen river, they came under a point-blank fire from no less than seven U.S. artillery pieces and up to two hundred of Forsyth’s riflemen, garrisoning the community’s small fort stockade. This inflicted a significant number of casualties upon the attackers, including Captain Jenkins, who had an arm amputated by the direct impact of artillery “grapeshot.” Continuing to advance and urging his men on, Jenkins was hit yet again, incapacitating him entirely. Under this withering and accurate fire, the column faltered and then withdrew toward Prescott. Here they were rallied and advanced again in support of Macdonell’s column, which by then had taken full control of the village and were calling for Forsyth and his men to surrender. Refusing this demand, Forsyth fired his remaining artillery as a final show of defiance before making a hasty retreat with his unwounded men through the fort’s rear gate, heading for the nearby woods and then for Sackets Harbor. Left behind were a number of detachments of local militia and the wounded, so that following a mopping-up operation within the various buildings, the final American casualty count was estimated at over fifty men.*[6] In addition, a substantial total of ordnance, arms, accoutrements, and supplies also fell into British hands. So voluminous was the total that it took most of the following day to transport it all across the river. Unfortunately, in addition to the legitimate official spoils of victory, some looting of civilian houses in the village also took place. To the credit of the attackers, once this became known to the various officers they went to some lengths to retrieve items “acquired” by their men for return to their legitimate owners. However, nothing could be done about the looting that was confirmed as being done by the retreating American troops or opportunistic members of the local American civilian population. In an interesting sidebar to this event, there are also strong indications that some of the women from Prescott took advantage of the British victory to engage in what today might be colloquially termed a “five-finger discount, cross-border shopping expedition,” as a number were subsequently witnessed returning across the river to Prescott during the course of the following day, bearing various sized bundles of items.

With the military garrison subdued and emptied of its valuable weapons and supplies, the fortifications and military warehouses at Ogdensburg were set alight, as were two gunboats and the frozen-in armed schooners Niagara and Dolphin. Returning to Prescott, Major Macdonell forwarded his official report to Kingston for Sir George Prevost to read and react to.

Upon receipt of Macdonell’s report, Sir George was placed in an awkward position. The attack had been undertaken against his openly expressed verbal directions, and even against a letter written after he had departed Prescott. On the other hand, it had resulted in a resounding victory. To now criticize or censure Macdonell for disobedience of orders would only be seen as “sour grapes” and reflect badly on his own position and authority to control his subordinates. He therefore chose to turn a blind eye to this insubordination in his official public release on the action:

The Commander of the Forces was induced to authorize this attack, not by any means as an act of wanton aggression … but as one of just and necessary retaliation for that which was recently made on the British settlement of Brockville by a party from Ogdensburg … and in announcing its result, His Excellency feels much pleasure in publically expressing his entire approbation of the gallantry and judgment with which it appears to have been conducted….[7]

He also altered the phrasing of Macdonell’s official report to create a new version that was forwarded to London, implying that the initiative was, in fact, authorized by him.

Bulletin No. 46, Sir George Prevost to Earl Bathurst, London … I have the honour of transmitting to Your Lordship the report which Major Macdonnel of the Glengarry Light Infantry Fencibles has made to me of the spirited manner in which he carried into execution my orders on this occasion.[8]

Macdonell was officially “off the hook” and soon became the hero of the hour as the leader of the raid. Unfortunately, no credit was subsequently given to the true architect of the victory, Colonel Pearson — for it was entirely due to his training and preparation of the troops, his design of the plan of action, and his determination to eliminate Ogdensburg as a threat that preserved the slender vital-supply lifeline that linked Lower and Upper Canada.

In contrast, the American reaction to the attack was dramatic and panic stricken. At Sackets Harbor the whole of the local militias were called out and ordered to construct new earthworks and extensive lines of abattis around the base to fend off an anticipated immediate British attack. Regular troops at Plattsburg were rushed overland in sleighs to Sackets to enlarge the garrison, and even Major General Dearborn and the new naval commander Commodore Isaac Chauncey hastened to that post to prepare for the expected onslaught. When this attack failed to materialize, however, instead of standing down his forces, Dearborn decided to implement his invasion plan against Upper Canada, starting from Sackets Harbor. In part, this was from having some of the required troops already in position, but also because the populace of Ogdensburg had raised a hue and cry with the state and federal governments. Far from accepting the British attack as an inevitable result of the international conflict, they blamed Brown and Forsyth’s aggressions and the military policies of the government for causing their distressed plight and demanded that no replacement garrison be installed in their community.

Despite the strategic importance of Ogdensburg as the principal point at which the Americans could effectively cut the British supply line to Upper Canada, the upcoming state elections forced the American government to acquiesce to the citizen’s demands that for the remainder of the war no significant American military presence garrisoned Ogdensburg. In fact, later accounts report that within weeks, conditions had returned to an almost pre-war state of mutual neutrality between the two communities. Citizens of Prescott continued to shop in Ogdensburg and U.S. civilians were entertained as guests in several prominent local Canadian houses. In addition, extensive and lucrative private agreements were made by the British Army commissariat for the purchase of American cattle and other goods to feed the troops billeted in and around Prescott.