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The Opening Round, June to August 1812

Following the official public declaration of war in Washington on June 19, 1812, events began to occur at an increasing pace as notices were dispatched to the frontiers by a series of messengers. Unfortunately for the Americans, although editorials on the imminence of war had filled the pages of the nation’s newspapers for months, once it began the more efficient British communications network notified their distant garrisons before their American counterparts had heard the news. This led to the opportunity for enterprising British and Canadian troops to engage in some pre-emptive strikes. For example, on June 29, at the eastern end of Upper Canada, a detachment of militia stationed at Prescott saw eight U.S. vessels passing upriver on the St. Lawrence, headed for Lake Ontario. Using a number of bateaux and longboats, the detachment chased the American vessels, intercepting them near Elizabethtown (later renamed Brockville). The schooners Sophia and Island Packet were boarded, captured, and subsequently burnt, while the remaining six American boats fled back to their base at Ogdensburg, becoming prisoners in their own port. In a similar fashion, on June 27, two longboats filled with around forty militiamen and regulars from Fort Erie were able to intercept the schooner Connecticut as it set sail on Lake Erie from Buffalo for Detroit. While at the other end of that lake, men from the Provincial Marine, accompanied by six soldiers from Fort Amherstburg (also known as Fort Malden), used a longboat to pursue, catch, and board the American schooner Cuyahoga Packet. Taking the vessel into the harbour at Amherstburg, they found that not only had they captured a detachment of thirty American troops, but also a cargo of food, medical supplies, entrenching tools, and baggage. This material had only been put on board the vessel the previous day and was part of a consignment accompanying Brigadier General William Hull’s army in its march from Dayton, Ohio, to garrison Detroit. While the supplies were a welcome addition to the depleted reserves of the British force, the captors also discovered that they had gained a huge intelligence coup in the form of a chest containing Hull’s entire personal and official correspondence. This included instructions for General Hull from the American secretary of war, the muster rolls of manpower for his command, and a complete set of lists detailing the quantities of ammunition, arms, and other supplies accompanying the army in its march to Detroit.

Brigadier General William Hull (artist unknown). The American commander at the fall of Detroit — the first of many military failures for the American war effort in 1812.

From the Conger Goodyear Manuscript Collection, Vol. 9. Courtesy of the Buffalo and Erie County Historical Society Research Library, Buffalo, NY.

Further north, the isolated garrison at St. Joseph Island, located at the head of Lake Huron, learned of the declaration of war on July 8. The garrison’s commander, Captain Charles Roberts (10th Veteran Battalion) acted immediately by organizing a lightning pre-emptive strike against the far more strategically advantageous and militarily superior American base of Fort Michilimackinac (also referred to at the time and known today as Fort Mackinac) some forty-five miles away. On the morning of July 16th, Roberts set sail in a small flotilla of longboats and canoes with a combined force of regulars, militia, and Natives, amounting to about 630 men. The following morning, before daylight, the attack force landed undetected at the northern end of Mackinac Island. Forming a column from his few regular and militia troops, Roberts flanked this force with his two large contingents of Native warriors. While at the rear, a number of men manhandled the single antique 6-pounder artillery piece that had been brought along to assault the American fortifications.

The American fortifications at the island of Michilimackinac [Mackinac]

From Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812 (artist unknown)..

Advancing along the narrow track that led to the fort, the infantry and Natives deployed into their separate battle formations, while the artillerists dragged the small cannon to a nearby piece of high ground that overlooked the fort. With his forces in place, Captain Roberts sent a note to the American garrison commander, Lieutenant Porter Hanks (U.S. Artillery), demanding the immediate and unconditional surrender of the American position. Unaware of the formal onset of war, unprepared and facing a strong enemy force, Hanks’ command officially consisted of only around sixty men. Of this small number, several men were sick, while many of the remainder were relatively elderly or otherwise considered unfit for active service. As a result, with no real alternative before him, Hanks surrendered the strategic position without a shot being fired. Tactically this victory was of only minor value, but strategically it swung the balance of power in the upper Great Lakes by securing the alliance of the western Native nations to the British war effort. It also had a decisive effect on the subsequent events that were to unfold on the Detroit frontier.

Back on the Niagara frontier, the American forces were also caught off guard. According to local folklore, when the notice of the declaration of war was delivered to Fort George the officers of the British garrison were entertaining their opposite numbers from Fort Niagara at a dinner in the officers’ mess. In a show of courtesy, the American officers were not immediately interred. Instead, the dinner was concluded with loyal toasts and expressions that a similar dinner would be held following the termination of hostilities. Following the meal the American officers were permitted to return to Fort Niagara, there to prepare for war to commence the following day.

Fort George, E. Walsh, artist, circa 1805. The parade ground and officer’s mess at Fort George in the pre-war period. (Below): A 2012 view of the reconstructed officer’s mess in the National Historic site of Fort George at Niagara-on-the-Lake.

Courtesy of the Clement Library, University of Michigan.

Despite gaining these minor victories, the fact remained that the British military position in Upper Canada was precarious at best. Britain was fully committed to the war in Europe and consequently had little in the way of resources that could be spared for the North Americas. Nor could the colonial economies provide the necessary agricultural or manufactured supplies needed to sustain the war effort on their own. Even where supplies were forthcoming, they had to be transported along a long and tenuous transportation network that was constantly open to being attacked or cut by enemy action. In view of these difficulties, securing and defending the vital lifeline of the St. Lawrence River, Niagara frontier, and Detroit River corridor became a top priority in the military planning of successive British commanders in Upper Canada. Unfortunately, each in his turn had to deal with Sir George Prevost, who was seemingly willing to entirely abandon Upper Canada so that he could keep the bulk of his supplies and manpower in Lower Canada, “just in case” of an attack against Montreal, Quebec, or Halifax.

In comparison, the American war effort, while getting off to a bad start, had the strategic advantage of being waged on its own continent. Furthermore, despite logistical difficulties and equally poor roads, each of the fronts could be supplied with men and equipment by several distinct and relatively secure routes. In addition, the larger base population, coupled with a relatively strong industrial and agricultural sector, provided the resources needed to supply the armies on an ongoing and timely basis. Having gone to the trouble of declaring war, the American administration naturally looked to its military to supply it with victories to justify its action.

Unfortunately, these American laurels were not to appear for some time, as General Henry Dearborn found that his goal for an immediate four-pronged assault on the Canadas was stalled before it had even begun. His proposed main thrust (toward Montreal from Albany) failed to recruit men; while the New England states of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island refused outright to acknowledge the national call to arms and raised the question of seceding from the Union rather than have their men “dragged out of the State to fight Indians or die before the walls of Quebec.”[1] Further inland, his planned second thrust (from Sackets Harbor against Kingston) was woefully short of weapons and ammunition, thus preventing any significant offensive from that base for some time. It was therefore up to Dearborn’s commanders on the Niagara and Detroit frontiers, respectively Major General Stephen Van Rensselaer and Brigadier General William Hull, to press the American cause. Of the two, it was General Hull, who was also the governor of the Michigan Territory, who made the first move.

THE DETROIT CAMPAIGN,

JULY TO AUGUST 1812

Even before war had been declared, the Detroit frontier, although the most isolated of the potential war zones, had been given particular attention by the military planners of both Britain and the United States. As early as February 1812, General Brock had set down his “Plans for the Defence of Canada.” In this memorandum he outlined the vital need to secure the alliance of as many of the First Nations tribes as possible to counteract the American advantages of men and logistics. To this end, Michilamackinac was to be seized, followed by the forwarding of as many troops as could be spared from York and the Niagara to commence a direct offensive from Amherstburg against Detroit. By these bold thrusts and hopefully quick victories, Brock hoped to secure the Native tribes as allies of the Crown. In support of this, Brock made a flying visit to Amherstburg from June 14–17, 1812. While he brought supplies and around a hundred reinforcements for the post, he also paid particular attention to solidifying the tacit pact between the Native leaders and himself. He even went so far as to commit himself and his government to press for the establishment of a formal Native homeland that would act as a buffer zone between the two expansionist nations following a successful conclusion of the war.

The “Detroit frontier” in 1812.

From Major John Richardson, Richardson’s War of 1812, 1842.

In a similar fashion, the United States took steps before war became a reality to bolster their military position on the Detroit frontier. On May 25, General Hull was in Dayton, Ohio, massing his regular and militia forces for an expedition to reinforce the small garrison at Detroit, some two hundred miles (340 kilometres) away. By July 1, unaware of the declaration of war, Hull’s army was at the Maumee Rapids, where he decided to lighten his baggage train by placing a portion of his equipment and supplies, as well as his own personal baggage and correspondence, onboard the Cuyahoga Packet. The intention being that they would be waiting for him when he and his army completed the journey along the shore. The next day word of the declaration of war arrived, but it was too late to prevent the capture of the Cuyahoga Packet and the vital stash of military paperwork by the British. Hastening on, Hull’s army of around 2,500 men arrived at Detroit on July 6 and immediately set about strengthening the post’s defences, while equally making preparations to conduct an offensive campaign against Fort Amherstburg, some fourteen miles (22.4 kilometres) downriver from Detroit and on the other side of the river in Upper Canada. Commanding that small garrison was Lieutenant Colonel Thomas St. George (63rd Regiment), a sixty-year-old veteran soldier of the European wars. Under his command, including the latest reinforcements, he only had around 250 regular troops. In addition, while there were, on paper, at least 600 Essex and Kent County Embodied Militia that could be called upon, most were, at best, half-hearted in their enthusiasms. Finally, there were the crews of the various vessels stationed at Amherstburg and around two hundred Native warriors under the command of Tecumseh.

On July 12th, 1812, an American invasion force of between 1,500 and 2,000 men (depending on whose account you read) crossed the Detroit River, landing a little above the village of Sandwich (Windsor). Despite the fact that there were some four hundred Canadian militia detailed to defend that position, backed by small detachments of regulars and artillery, nothing was done to oppose the landings, as the militia made it clear that if they were attacked they would retire, with or without orders! Left with no alternative and hoping to maintain some kind of fighting force, St. George ordered the withdrawal of all troops toward Amherstburg and the destruction of the bridges across the various creeks. The way was now open for a dynamic thrust by the Americans that would secure the entire western end of the province and provide Washington with its demanded victory. Instead, apart from sending out reconnaissance patrols as far south as the Canard River, and a large foraging (looting) expedition up the line of the Thames River, Hull ordered his army into a defensive posture around the village of Sandwich, still within sight of Detroit. To confirm his victory, he then sent out copies of a bombastic proclamation to espouse his role as the liberator of Upper Canada:

Inhabitants of Canada! After thirty years of Peace and prosperity, the United States have been driven to Arms. The injuries and aggressions, the insults and indignities have once more left them no alternative but manly resistance or unconditional submission. The army under my command has invaded your country and the standard of the United States waves on the territory of Canada. To the peaceable unoffending inhabitants, it brings neither danger nor difficulty. I come to find enemies not make them, I come to protect you not injure you…. You have felt [Great Britain’s] tyranny, you have seen her injustice, but I do not ask you to avenge the one or redress the other. The United States are sufficiently powerful to afford you every security … I tender you the invaluable blessings of Civil, Political, & Religious Liberty….[2]

On the other hand, he also warned of extreme retaliation if those loyal to the Crown took up arms or fought alongside the Natives, who were to be particularly targeted for imminent destruction.

I have a force which will look down all opposition and that force is but the vanguard of a much greater. If contrary to your own interest & the just expectation of my country, you should take part in the approaching contest, you will be considered and treated as enemies and the horrors and calamities of war will stalk before you. If the barbarous … savages are let loose to murder our citizens and butcher our women and children, this war will be a war of extermination…. No white man found fighting by the side of an Indian will be taken prisoner. Instant destruction will be his lot…. The United States offer you Peace, Liberty, and Security your choice lies between these and War, Slavery, and Destruction. Choose then, but choose wisely….[3]

Hull’s failure to advance with his decisive superiority of numbers was later decried as wanton cowardice by some historians, and it must be conceded that the man was strongly beset by indecision and doubts on the way to press his campaign. But beyond this he was confounded by the fact that in addition to chronic shortages of supplies and military equipment, his command was anything but unified. In fact, prior to the commencement of the invasion, several units of U.S. State militias had stood upon their constitutional and legal rights to only serve within the borders of the United States and had refused to cross the river. In addition, internecine rivalry between his junior commanders and questions of rank and privilege between the regular army and militia officers had turned Hull’s force into a collection of feuding fiefdoms, incapable of sustaining a united campaign into enemy territory.

During the next two weeks, U.S. outposts and pickets along the Canard River frequently skirmished with their British counterparts, with small numbers of casualties being recorded on both sides; but, beyond a moderate probe of the British line on the Canard on July 16th, the Americans made no serious effort to advance or attack Amherstburg. Even so, the initial invasion and ongoing presence and threat of the Americans caused nearly half of the Canadian militia at Amherstburg to desert to their homes or worse, to offer a promise of refusing to do military service if the Americans attacked. However, by July 25 this ongoing lack of offensive enemy action was enough to encourage a number of Native warriors to ambush an American outpost, inflicting several casualties. Instead of causing the Americans to renew their offensive, this minor incident prompted the invaders to withdraw their outposts north and concentrate their strength at their main lines around Sandwich.

Surprised and pleased with this event, St. George recognized that he was still significantly outnumbered and outgunned and that any direct military confrontation or conflict would inevitably result in the entire destruction of his command. He therefore decided to await further developments and remain at Amherstburg. The following day, General Brock’s second-in command, Colonel Henry Proctor, arrived from his previous post as senior officer on the Niagara frontier. Taking command of operations on the Detroit frontier, Proctor did not bring a significant number of additional troops or supplies, but he did bring a definite change in how future military activities were undertaken in the face of the American invasion. Reviewing the strategic and tactical situation with St. George, Proctor concurred that an all-out frontal assault on the Americans would be futile and probably catastrophic without substantial reinforcements. He therefore sent dispatches to General Brock, calling for an immediate concentration of all available regular and militia forces on the Detroit frontier and a subsequent campaign against the invaders. In the meantime, he sought to revive the morale and fighting spirit of his militias and Native allies by undertaking a show of offensive aggression. Having already learned from Hull’s captured papers that the U.S. troops were short of supplies and that a large supply convoy was on its way north from the River Raisin, Proctor looked to strike at his enemy where he was weakest — behind their lines on the U.S. side of the river.

Battles of Brownston and Maguaga, August 1812

Sending across a small composite force of around one hundred regulars and militia, under the command of Captain Adam Muir (41st Regiment), Proctor looked to cut off Hull’s lines of communications and possibly intercept the approaching convoy. Supporting this force were a body of Native warriors, led by Tecumseh, who initially moved south and located the expected convoy before returning and blockading the road that the convoy would have to follow. Learning of this British movement from a Canadian deserter, Hull countered by sending over two hundred Ohio State militia, commanded by Major Thomas Van Horne, with orders to link up with the convoy and escort it through to Detroit. On the morning of August 5, 1812, this relief force was marching through a section of thick woodland at the ford crossing Brownstown Creek, some fifteen miles south of Detroit. Enveloped by a thick fog, they failed to perceive their danger until it was too late when they were aggressively attacked by Tecumseh’s warriors. In a matter of moments, the Americans were routed for a recorded loss of some seventeen killed and twelve wounded, while the Natives suffered only one man killed. Fleeing back to Detroit, the militiamen brought with them exaggerated tales that the British had landed large bodies of troops behind the American lines and had now cut off all communications and hope of supplies to Hull’s army. A fiction, but one that was readily believed and only added to General Hull’s already growing list of bad news. These items included:

 Reports that several of the Native tribes’ were shifting in their attitudes from maintaining a cowed neutrality to becoming a potential or actual aggressive enemy force.

 Word that the relief column was now refusing to advance until a strong escort and guarantee of safe passage could be provided.

 News of the fall of Michilimackinac from the lips of its own garrison commander.

 An intercepted communication from the Northwest Company post at Fort William claiming (falsely or mistakenly) that there were a potential five thousand Native warriors ready to come to the aid of the British from that quarter.

Despite these concerns, Hull continued making preparations for a major advance and assault on Amherstburg. On August 7 the final straw arrived in the form of news that General Brock was making active efforts to forward troops from Niagara and that one formation was already sailing up from Fort Erie.

In response, Hull entirely abandoned his plans for any further offensive actions. Thus, apart from a detachment of around 150 troops left behind to garrison a single fortification on the east bank, he ordered the entire evacuation of the remainder of his army from Upper Canada. During that night and following morning, a near-mutinous American army withdrew to Detroit, while Hull came under a storm of protest and criticism from his more aggressively minded regimental commanders. Seeking to re-establish his line of communications as his first priority, Hull ordered a new expedition be made by Lieutenant Colonel James Miller with over six hundred troops and two pieces of artillery. This force marched from Detroit on August 8th, passing the unburied corpses of the Brownstown rout the following day. Waiting a few miles further south, Captain Muir’s far smaller force of some 150 regulars, fifty men from the Essex Embodied Militia Regiment, and two hundred Native warriors looked to repeat their earlier victory.

Late in the afternoon fighting began between the advanced pickets of both forces. This quickly escalated as the Americans pressed their advantage of numbers and used their disciplined firepower to maintain pressure on the British line, while successfully driving back the Native incursions on their flank. This was reflected on the British side by a series of tactical errors, when one flank of the British regular force mistakenly retreated instead of advancing, leaving the remainder of the line in serious danger of being outflanked and surrounded. In addition, a detachment of regular troops that had only been added to Muir’s force that day mistook the Native allies for Americans and fired upon them. This precipitated a lengthy round of friendly fire between the two groups and inflicted a number of casualties upon both units. With the Americans pressing aggressively through the centre, thus splitting the British and Native force in two, the British position soon became untenable. In response, a seriously wounded Captain Muir was forced to order a retreat to the boats at the riverbank and a return to Amherstburg.

Despite having achieved a military victory at what the Americans later called the Battle of Monguagon (in British accounts, Maguaga) and successfully opened the lines of communication once more, Miller made no serious effort to press on to link up with the vital supply column. Instead, claiming the loss of most of his men’s backpacks and rations to Native pilfering during the course of the fighting, he kept his force encamped at the battlefield under a succession of days of torrential rain that reduced the roadway to a quagmire of mud. Nor did things improve when Hull sent a small relief-convoy of boats — that brought only a single day’s rations for Miller’s men. Furthermore this flotilla of nine boats was subsequently intercepted and captured by the British during its return trip upriver, leaving Miller believing that his force could be attacked from both the front and rear. Finally, mud-caked, hungry, and exhausted, Miller’s column marched back into Detroit with nothing but the moral claim of a victory to their credit, as once again the British were monitoring the southern road and the supply convoy had been told by Hull to abandon any further attempt to advance until it was provided with a suitable escort.

Thoroughly alarmed at his deteriorating situation, General Hull ordered the small detachment still remaining in Upper Canada to abandon their position on the 11th. For those Upper Canada citizens and deserting militiamen who had previously welcomed or actively assisted the invaders, their future looked dire as they were certain to be singled out for retribution by their Loyalist neighbours or even charged with treason. In consequence, while some collected their families, abandoned their homes, and fled to the U.S. east bank, others decamped into the interior of Upper Canada, to continue their opposition to the Crown as renegades and officially denounced traitors. Opposition to Hull’s continued command of the U.S. “Northwest Army” now erupted in full force within his already divided command, with letters and petitions for his removal being openly circulated within the ranks and senior subordinate officers actively making plans to stage a coup.

Reacting to the Americans retreat, Proctor ordered an advance of his own smaller forces beyond the Canard River and occupied Sandwich on August 12, 1813. He then set about constructing new artillery positions at the riverbank fronting Detroit that were subsequently armed with one 18-pounder, two 12-pounders, and two 5½-inch mortars. To man these works he assigned the first of the detachments of newly arrived reinforcements sent by Brock, men from the Norfolk Militia units at Long Point under Lieutenant George Ryerson. During this same period, although isolated from the scene of action and increasingly concerned about the paucity of intelligence and information that was reaching him at York, Major-General Brock was actively pursuing a policy of preparing to meet the American invasion with force. He had already effectively ignored Prevost’s previous orders on the need to act with circumspection, and now added to this by discounting a new dispatch informing him that Prevost was in the process of negotiating with General Dearborn for the implementation of an armistice.

Brock’s initial plan had been to mobilize all his forces of militia and Natives and march them to Amherstburg. However, the Six Nations Native tribes on the Grand River now declared their determination to remain neutral, while several units of the militia likewise refused to come forward as ordered. With a disturbingly sparse reserve of regular troops*[4] and only a half-hearted support from the provincial legislature, Brock was left with no choice but to mobilize the local Embodied Militia Regiments, who did turn out, and send what detachments he could forward to reinforce Proctor. Unfortunately, he did this without ensuring that he had the means to pay them, which greatly alarmed the army bureaucrats:

I have this morning received a letter from Deputy General Commissary Couche, which occasions me the greatest alarm, he informs me that Major General Brock has ordered out one-third of the Militia of Upper Canada / about 4000 men / and he begs to be informed in what manner they are to be paid. The expense attending this measure will be about fifteen thousand Pounds a month, a sum which it will be impracticable to find in that country. Nor have I the means of affording effectual assistance at this moment, and if the Militia are not regularly paid, great evil will ensue, indeed, Mr. Couche represents some symptoms of discontent have already appeared.[5]

— William Robinson, Commissary General’s Office to Sir George Prevost, July 30, 1812

Proroguing the Upper Canada Parliament on August 5th, Brock was encouraged to see that, heartened by the news of the capture of Michilimackinac, virtually the entire corps of the York militia had volunteered for action. However, including this force along with the regulars in an expedition to Amherstburg would leave the position at York effectively undefended. As a result, Brock only selected around one hundred men from this regiment to make the trip. He was also assisted in his plans by the arrival of two experienced senior regular officers from Lower Canada in the persons of Lieutenant Colonel Christopher Myers and Major General Roger H. Sheaffe. With these two available to take over the respective commands of quartermaster general and senior commander for the Niagara frontier, Brock now felt himself free to personally advance to Amherstburg to take command of whatever situation he found upon his arrival.

Departing York that same day, Brock and his composite force of some forty regulars (41st Regiment) and 240 militia set out to march overland the over seventy-five miles to Port Dover. Arriving there on August 8th, Brock personally addressed a gathering of over 500 local militiamen with such dynamism that, contrary to their earlier reluctance, the men volunteered en masse to follow Brock into battle. With only sufficient vessels to transport 400, however, Brock chose to sail down the lake with whatever force could be crammed into the barely seaworthy boats, while the remainder would begin the long march along the Talbot Road. Contending with atrocious weather, rough waters, and dangerous rock shoals, the small flotilla of boats eventually landed at Amherstburg on August 13, 1812.

Reviewing the captured documents from the Cuyahoga Packet, Brock was able to accurately assess the growing and widespread disaffection within the American army from a stash of private letters captured at the Brownstown engagement. These came from several senior officers within Hull’s corps of officers and gave clear indications of the weakness of the enemy. In response, General Brock, despite the reservations and advice of Proctor and St. George, entered into negotiations with Chief Tecumseh for a substantial counterattack on the American position at Detroit. Encouraged by Brock’s aggressive stance and keen to see the Americans defeated, Tecumseh agreed to the plan.

On August 14, Brock issued a general order that firstly congratulated Proctor, St. George, and the men of the militias who had remained steadfast in the defence of their colony, while secondly expressing surprise at those of the militias who had deserted their duties. He then directed that all absentees immediately return to the colours or face the prospect of being punished according to the rules outlined in the new Militia Act passed earlier in the year.

Meanwhile on the American side of the river, General Hull, well aware of the growing groundswell of opposition and even the conspiracy against him, was restrained from moving against its chief plotters by the threat of it precipitating an open mutiny by the entire army. Instead, he detailed the two senior-ranking conspirators, Colonel Duncan McArthur and Colonel Lewis Cass, both of the Ohio State militia, to take a force of over 350 men and march by a circuitous inland route to link up with the supply convoy. Coincidentally, both armies began their respective operations at dawn the following day. As a result, the American’s lost their most aggressive commanders and a sizeable body of troops, while the British, further reinforced by detachments that had just completed the exhausting march overland from Long Point, advanced on Sandwich. By sunset of the 15th, the American detachment was some twenty-four miles away, while the British were looking across the Detroit River as their already emplaced artillery began a bombardment of the American troop encampments at Detroit. Also during the course of that day, General Brock sent an ultimatum to Hull calling for his surrender and using a carrot and stick address to reinforce his position:

The force at my disposal authorises me to require of you the immediate surrender of Detroit. It is far from my intention to join in a war of extermination, but you must be aware of that the numerous body of Indians who have attached themselves to my troops will be beyond control the moment the contest commences. You will find me disposed to enter into such conditions as will satisfy the most scrupulous sense of honour … that will lead to any unnecessary effusion of blood.[6]

Faced with this threat, Hull replied with a seemingly brave and defiant rebuff:

I have received your letter of this date. I have no other reply to make, than to inform you that I am prepared to meet any force which may be at your disposal, and any consequences which may result from any exertion of it you may think proper to make.[7]

At the same time he sent urgent orders for McArthur and Cass to immediately march back to defend Detroit, and placed his Detroit garrison on full alert for an imminent British attack. Before dawn on August 16, 1812, six hundred of Brock’s Native allies crossed the Detroit River and landed at Spring Wells, three miles south of Detroit, to secure a landing ground. Shortly thereafter, a flotilla of small boats containing Brock’s main force of some 330 regulars, 400 militia, and five cannon made their own crossing, all under the protective screen of ships from the Provincial Marine department.*[8] Seeking to further magnify the apparent strength of his small invasion force, Brock had previously directed that as many of the militia as possible were to be issued cast-off or spare regular redcoat uniforms to make them look like “real” soldiers to the Americans. Landing unopposed and forming their column-of-march, Brock received intelligence that some of McArthur and Cass’s troops were only three miles to his south. Faced with the prospect of being caught in a vice between two enemy forces, Brock would have been entirely justified in retreating back to the east side of the river; instead he ordered an immediate advance upon Detroit. Awaiting his just-over-a-thousand troops and Native warriors were Hull’s garrison of an estimated 2,500 American troops, entrenched behind a line of strong earthworks and fortifications, bristling with no less than thirty-three cannon.

The plan of the town and fortifications at Detroit in 1812.

From Richardson’s War of 1812.

Advancing to within a mile of the fortifications, Brock halted the column and began to deploy his line. In a deft example of bravado and sleight of hand, the general spread out his units to make them appear more numerous. In addition, he made extensive use of the Natives to engage in psychological warfare by making probes and threatening attacks on the American flanks. By these ruses, and supported by the continued cannonade from his batteries on the east bank of the Detroit River, Brock succeeded in demoralizing General Hull and his army to the point where sizeable numbers of militia began abandoning their assigned posts for the sanctuary of the distant forests. Seeing his force dwindling, and already visibly shaken by the effect of the British bombardment, Hull was beset by the dilemma that as well as being the military commander of the garrison, he was also the governor of Michigan, making the welfare and safety of the civilian populace his direct responsibility. If he gave battle and lost, Brock’s Native warriors could well be unleashed, with terrifying consequences for all the Americans in Detroit. Making his decision, Hull gave the order for his troops to hold their fire while he entered into negotiations for a formal capitulation. Following a brief exchange of demands, General Hull not only agreed to surrender the fort, its garrison, and all supplies therein,*[9] , *[10] but also the relief column at Frenchtown on the River Raisin, the garrison at the Maumee Rapids, and the forces of McArthur and Cass — who were now conspicuous by their continued absence. In fact, these latter officers had previously deliberately ignored Hull’s orders to return when the threat was initially revealed on the 14th, and remained encamped overnight before making a more leisurely return march until they came within two miles of the fort and heard the sounds of the British cannonade from across the river. Without making any reconnaissance or notifying Hull of their presence, they ordered their troops to turn about once again and made a hasty retreat to the River Rouge, where they remained until officially notified that Detroit had been surrendered. Whereupon the two officers made a vehement public show of being outraged and surprised at Hull’s capitulation, and condemned him for sending them from Detroit at a time of danger. By this they successfully established their own alibis and distanced themselves from the inevitable official American censure that would follow, once news of the surrender became public.

In addition to these logistical and troop surrenders, in the aftermath of the surrender, General Brock’s proclamation to the populace of the Michigan Territory (August 16, 1812), stipulated a claim that was to have significant repercussions upon the future conduct and course of the war. Namely that the territory had been ceded to the control and authority of the British Crown, and therefore was now de facto part of British North America and Upper Canada.

Whereas the territory of Michigan was this day by Capitulation ceded to the Arms of His Britannick Majesty, without any other condition than the protection of private property, and wishing to give an early proof of the moderation and Justice of His Majesty’s Government, I do hereby announce to all the Inhabitants of the said Territory that the Laws heretofore in existence shall continue in force until His Majesty’s pleasure be known …[11]

Interestingly, in most of the subsequent American histories on the war, this territorial loss of part of the United States is either entirely ignored or dismissed as merely British wordplay or bravado. However, in the light of the following details, there can be little doubt that as far as Brock and his administration was concerned this change in allegiance and control was real enough.

 The territory had previously been British property and had only been handed over to American control eighteen years previous as part of the treaty’s dealing with the American Revolution. In addition, many of its inhabitants were previously British subjects, a status Britain maintained was a permanent fact and not revocable.

 On August 21, Proctor issued a subsequent proclamation of his own, stating:

Whereas the Territory of Michigan, was on the sixteenth day of August, one thousand eight hundred twelve, Ceded by Capitulation to the arms of HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY, & the American flag was removed and the British flag substituted … be it known, that I, the undersigned, HENRY PROCTOR, Colonel in the Military forces of HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY, now Commanding in the Territory of Michigan, do make & establish … the following Regulations for the civil administration of the said Territory …[12]

 Several letters were subsequently exchanged between Colonel Proctor and American Chief Justice of the Territory Augustus Woodward, over defining the area the British now officially controlled and other details of the change in the existing American administration to British hands. In these communications, both officials refer to the “change of flag” and the territory being “ceded.”

 Governor Hull never denounced or repudiated the validity of the British claim.

 In the following months, Proctor established a new bureaucracy of civil administration, and Michigan citizens were called upon to swear the oath of allegiance to the British Crown or quit the territory — while many chose to take the oath, many others refused and left.

 Lands on the west side of the Detroit River were officially deeded over as settlements to Native allies by Proctor on behalf of the British Government.

Furthermore, when the news of the “ceding” reached Washington, far from being simply dismissed or denounced as invalid, it was considered such a political disaster that it almost toppled the administration. The War Hawks saw the ceding as a stain upon the national pride of the United States, requiring an immediate and total commitment on the part of the nation to reclaim its lost lands as soon as possible, again countering the subsequent claims that it was merely an error in British phrasing.

In the immediate term, the American “Northwestern Army” was effectively eliminated and the biggest problem facing Brock was what to do with his overwhelming number of prisoners. After leaving behind the sick and wounded (117 Officers, 480 Other Ranks), the remaining regular officers and their troops (532 All Ranks), plus a large proportion of militia officers and men (1034 All Ranks), were transported to either Lower Canada (regulars) or the Niagara frontier (militias).[13] For those now in Lower Canada, they were destined to either remain as prisoners of war for the duration of the conflict or, in the case of the more lucky individuals, repatriated to the United States on the condition of having given their “paroles.” This nicety of warfare in an age of “gentlemen” required individuals to sign an oath not to engage in any further combat or offensive activities until formally and officially released from their parole by a mutually agreed and signed written declaration issued by both of the warring governments. Alternatively, the parole could be ended if they were officially and mutually exchanged for an equal number of British and Canadian equivalent ranks then being held as prisoners in the U.S. This parole system was also adopted for both the American militias taken to the Niagara frontier and those left behind on the Detroit frontier, allowing the men to eventually return to their homes.

Buoyed by his stunning and unexpected victory, Brock was also anxious to return to the Niagara frontier as soon as possible. Having previously dispatched the Queen Charlotte with her cargo of 130 American regular prisoners of war for Fort Erie, he followed on August 19 in the smaller Cuyahoga Packet, now renamed the Chippawa, crammed with around twenty regular troops under the guard of a handful of the York Militia. During the passage, the disgruntled prisoners were seen as such a threat to the vessel that the ship’s captain was forced to order their confinement below decks, while their guards were equally forced to remain exposed on deck during a series of severe thunderstorms that threatened to swamp the ship. Approaching Fort Erie on the night of the 22–23rd, the vessel was becalmed in a dense fog bank and anchored to await the dawn. With daylight, to the British commander’s consternation he found that the Chippawa had moored within rifle-shot range of the American shoreline off the village of Buffalo. Seeing what they still believed to be an American vessel, curious citizens began to gather along the shore to hear news from the Detroit frontier. Under imminent threat of being challenged, discovered, boarded, and captured, Brock and the other identifiable “redcoats” were forced to remain hidden, while the boat’s crew attempted to tow the ship away from the shore using a small longboat. However, despite strenuous efforts, the current of the Niagara River prevented the boat making any appreciable movement upstream. Unable to escape under their own efforts, Brock took a chance and authorized one of the militiamen to fire off a single shot in an attempt to attract the attention of the Queen Charlotte moored across the channel off Fort Erie, without drawing the suspicions of the nearer Americans on shore. Fortunately, the attempt worked and the Queen Charlotte came across to investigate, protecting the smaller vessel with her battery of guns while providing additional towing help that allowed the Chippawa to draw away from the American shore and moor off Fort Erie. Collecting those prisoners already landed, Brock marched them along the river road, in plain sight of the gathering American forces on the east bank, possibly as a warning of their potential fate if they too attempted an invasion. A message that obviously carried some weight if the contents of a letter from Major General Van Rensselaer to Major General Dearborn, dated September 1, 1812, is to be considered accurate:

… it is a fact that cannot be concealed that the surrender of General Hull’s army has spread great alarm among the inhabitants of this Frontier, and I every day perceive strong symptoms of distrust among the troops. They have seen their countrymen surrendered without a single effort, and marched, prisoners, before their eyes. They cannot comprehend it.[14]