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Victories, But for Whom?

Despite having achieved major military victories at Fort York and Fort George, instead of being lauded as the hero of the hour, Major General Dearborn found himself beset by the old adage that bad news often comes in threes.

First, according to his original plan, following the successful conclusion of his invasion of the Niagara frontier, Dearborn’s army was to have moved west to link up with Major General Harrison’s forces to recover the Michigan Territory. Unfortunately, this entire part of the campaign had been effectively scuttled by the unexpected aggressiveness of Brigadier General Proctor and his forces at Amherstburg.

Ever since the death of General Brock, in October 1812, General Proctor had been repeatedly denied more than a trickle of reinforcements and supplies by General Sheaffe, who favoured defending the Niagara frontier. In addition, Proctor’s latest intelligence reports indicated that the balance of power in the west had swung dramatically in favour of the Americans. There were three reasons for this:

 The loss of York in April had included the town’s warehouses, which contained vital naval construction materials destined for the shipyard at Amherstburg. Those supplies had either been burned or fallen into the hands of the Americans.

 The British abandonment of Fort Erie had allowed the previously trapped American vessels at Black Rock to escape and unite with the new ships being constructed at the Americans’ Lake Erie Naval Base at Erie (PA).

 A new set of massive fortifications (Fort Meigs) was being constructed on the Maumee River, and would almost certainly become Harrison’s base of operations for a new campaign to retake the Michigan Territory and possibly invade Upper Canada.

While Proctor knew there was nothing he could do about the events at York and Erie, the more time Harrison had to complete his preparations the more dangerous and difficult it would be for Proctor’s diminished and poorly supplied forces to eliminate this base or stop any subsequent invasion. Believing that he had no realistic alternative, and despite the considerable odds against it succeeding, Proctor ordered a pre-emptive offensive operation to besiege and capture Fort Meigs. For this campaign he cobbled together a combined force of 533 British regulars, 63 Fencibles, 462 Canadian militia, and 1,200 Native warriors.[1]

THE SIEGE OF FORT MEIGS, MAY 1–9, 1813

Sailing from Amherstburg on April 23rd, Proctor’s force landed at the mouth of the Maumee River that evening. They then had to overcome bad weather and mud choked trackways as they hauled their cannon overland, eventually reaching Fort Meigs on April 29th, whereupon they began erecting siege lines. By May 1st artillery batteries were erected on both the north and south sides of the Maumee River and they began a bombardment of the fort from two flanks. Following four days of round-the-clock firing, and constantly being berated by his Native allies for engaging in a siege rather than making an immediate frontal attack, Proctor still did not think that enough damage had been done to make any formal assault practicable.

Inside the fort, however, General Harrison was deeply concerned about his defensive capabilities. The British artillery barrage was inflicting such a degree of damage on his fortifications that it required constant repairs to maintain the defences. In addition, casualties had mounted to the point where he had been forced to build numerous earth embankments within the fort to shelter his troops from the artillery fire. Finally, his own lack of artillery ammunition required him to issue an offer of payment for each spent British cannonball that was located and brought in for reuse by the American batteries. Thus, when he received word on May 4th that a relief column of 1,200 Kentucky militia were approaching his position, Harrison decided to make an attempt to break the siege. He therefore communicated his plan to the commander of the relief column, Brigadier General Green Clay, for the two forces to work in concert. The following morning, forces from Fort Meigs made a sortie to attack the southern British batteries from the front. At the same time, the relief force moved forward in two columns. The “northern” column, under Colonel William Dudley, consisted of some 800 men in twelve boats. Their orders were to sail up the river and land on the northern bank of the Maumee River, destroy the northern British artillery positions, and then withdraw to the fort. Simultaneously, the “southern” column of 400 men, under General Clay in six boats, was to fight its way overland directly toward the southern batteries, catching the enemy between itself and Harrison’s sortie.

Initially, the American plan met with some success, with the northern battery being overrun and the guns spiked. However, a portion of the Kentucky militia disobeyed their explicit orders to maintain regimental discipline and went on a rampaging chase of Proctor’s retreating Native allies. In the thick forest the Natives ambushed the incautious militiamen, inflicting a catastrophic number of casualties. At the same time, a strong counterattack by the Essex and Kent Embodied Militias, backed by men of the 41st Regiment, soon recaptured the batteries and routed those Kentuckians who had obeyed Harrison’s orders. By the time the fighting ended, of the 800 men originally in this northern American force only 150 are recorded as escaping back to their boats. At the same time, the sortie from the fort also initially succeeded in penetrating the British lines and spiking some of the guns before they too were evicted by a counterattack. Clay’s southern column came under heavy fire while in the process of landing, and instead of attacking the British positions, took only what they could carry, abandoned their boats, and diverted directly to the fort. They linked up with Harrison’s garrison, but lost the remainder of their supplies and boats as plunder to the British and Native warriors.

Despite suffering heavy losses, which the Americans only officially listed as 81 killed and 189 wounded, Harrison’s garrison had gained some of the extra manpower and supplies it desperately needed and was able to continue to hold out. Proctor’s army, despite having recovered his batteries and inflicted such severe casualties on the enemy (having taken some thirty-four American officers and 420 other ranks prisoner alone), had also suffered a significant number of casualties during the attack (killed: 14 other ranks; wounded: 2 officers, 46 other ranks; prisoner: 2 officers, 39 other ranks).

By the end of the week, General Proctor was faced with the unpleasant fact that he could no longer maintain his siege and would have to retreat back to Amherstburg. This seemingly surprising turn of events came about quite simply — the majority of Proctor’s Native and militia troops had deserted from the siege lines. This was partially because, having already become encumbered by large amounts of booty and trophies of war, the Natives became angry and considered themselves betrayed by the British when they were denied what they considered their right to collect further trophies or exact reprisals upon captured American prisoners, as was their custom. This situation became critical when, witnessing a group of Natives starting to rob and then attack a group of unarmed American prisoners, British soldiers had stepped in to halt the potential massacre. When this had proved useless, as the Native depredations continued, the British troops were left with no choice but to fight off their own supposed allies, at the cost of several men wounded and at least one killed from their own ranks. This serious incident fatally fractured the alliance and caused all but a handful of warriors to abandon the siege. In the case of the militia, the campaign had been started at the crucial point of the season when the men were most needed at home to plant their crops. As a result, following the submission of a strongly worded petition outlining their desperate concerns, many of the militiamen decided that their personal need to return to their homesteads for crop planting had become a higher priority (to prevent the future starvation of their families), than maintaining a drawn-out encirclement of an enemy fort in the middle of nowhere.

Nonetheless, even with the eventual withdrawal of Proctor’s forces on May 9th, the combined effect of the American losses at the battle of Fort Meigs, the damage to the fort, and the substantial negative impact it had on subsequent American efforts to recruit a new militia force, especially in Kentucky, meant that the campaign to retake Michigan and invade Upper Canada through the Detroit corridor was crippled for the foreseeable future. Consequently, General Dearborn and his army on the Niagara was the sole thrust of American operations against the enemy in Upper Canada.

Second in Dearborn’s list of troubles was that the general’s own command was beset by discontent and dissent. Always a temperamental commander, General Dearborn had increasingly favoured a clique of handpicked subordinates and isolated himself from his other officers. Now in failing health, and increasingly “crusty” in temper, his daily command duties had been assumed by an “outsider,” his ambitious second-in-command, Major General Morgan Lewis. This officer was one who Dearborn had previously dismissed as “totally destitute of any practical qualifications necessary for an officer of his rank.”[2] . In return, Lewis was no less contemptuous of “Granny” Dearborn and, seeing the victory at Fort George as his own, resented Dearborn garnering any credit for the action. Under this mutual antipathy, Lewis therefore saw no dereliction of his duty in detailing Dearborn’s command shortcomings within private reports to his brother-in-law, the secretary of war, John Armstrong. In addition, Lewis had his own set of supporters, which created a level of vicious political infighting within the American regimental commands that far outstripped Hull’s similar situation the previous year at Detroit. Consequently, following the battle at Fort George, when criticism arose over the failure of the entire American force to aggressively pursue the British forces in its retreat to Queenston and the recall of Winfield Scott from his advanced position, Lewis wasted no time in falsely claiming the order came directly from Dearborn, an assertion Dearborn vehemently denied.

In response to these allegations of lethargy, Dearborn ordered Lewis to march out with almost half the army in pursuit of the retreating Crown forces, but did not stipulate any specific destination. Lewis, however, was not prepared to march off into the unknown and demanded that he be given, in writing, a more explicit set of orders. Dearborn responded by directing Lewis to move on Queenston and then advance to Beaver Dams. Lewis, on the other hand, believed that the British had already left Beaver Dams and were heading toward Forty Mile Creek. He therefore contradicted his commanding officer and demanded to have his route changed so that he could cut off Vincent’s retreat, or at least catch and attack him while Vincent was on the march and unable to prepare any proper defences. He also pressed for a simultaneous naval landing of troops at Head-of-the-Lake (Hamilton) to ensure Vincent’s encirclement.

Retorting that Lewis’ information was a deliberate ploy by Vincent to send the Americans in the wrong direction, Dearborn categorically ordered Lewis to follow his previously assigned route. However, later, after Lewis had marched for Queenston, Dearborn had second thoughts and authorized the preparation of some of the remaining units for transportation up the lake if further intelligence revealed the British were on the march. A fact soon conveyed to Vincent (who was still at Beaver Dams) and actually precipitated his further retreat — which in turn prevented Lewis’ troops from intercepting him.

Reaching Queenston Heights, Lewis’ troops found only the debris of Vincent’s retreat, while the enemy continued to elude them. Because of poor logistical support, Lewis’ column had marched without securing a sufficiency of provisions or camp equipment. Consequently they were hungry, footsore, tired, and soaked (as intermittent downpours of rain drenched them). Sending out foraging parties to appropriate all available food, Lewis’ troops occupied any building that offered shelter from the inclement weather and settled down for the night. At the same time, back at Fort George, Dearborn received confirmed reports of Vincent’s retreat. In response, instead of directing Lewis to march directly toward the enemy and sending him additional support, Dearborn sent him written orders to detach General Chandler’s brigade back to the fort as quickly as possible. Reluctantly complying with his commander’s demands the following morning, Lewis was still determined to initiate his own pursuit with what remained of his force and ordered an immediate advance, only to receive yet another set of written orders from Dearborn. These specifically terminated Lewis’ plans, reducing him to providing garrison forces at Queenston, Chippawa, and Fort Erie, and then returning to Fort George with the rump remnant of his detached command. Furious and frustrated at being thwarted yet again, Lewis had, ironically, been hoist on his own petard — as his earlier demands for more specific written orders from Dearborn came back with a vengeance to curtail his independence of command.

Reaching Burlington Heights on the evening of May 31st, Brigadier General Vincent and his troops had immediately begun to dig-in. Outnumbered by at least three to one, Vincent knew that, barring a miracle, he had a vital decision to make as to his further movements. His position at Burlington Heights allowed him to continue to supply Brigadier General Proctor and the Lake Erie fleet. Any further retreat would cut that lifeline and effectively hand the western end of Upper Canada to the Americans. On the other hand, Vincent also recognized that if he remained in position, the Americans could use their naval superiority to recross Lake Ontario, land troops in his rear, and cut off his own retreat to York and Kingston. Fortunately, the Americans remained at Fort George, which persuaded Vincent to hold his position and send urgent appeals to Prevost at Kingston to send up reinforcements and supplies aboard Sir James Yeo’s flotilla. In the meantime, Embodied Militia volunteers, three companies of the Incorporated Militia, and bands of Native warriors secured the flanks of the British position, reported on American movements, and collected any supplies of food and abandoned equipment that could be found along the line of the retreat, thus denying them to the enemy.

Unbeknownst to General Vincent, his earlier appeals for reinforcements and supplies and the latest news of the American inertia at the mouth of the Niagara had another effect entirely when they were received at Kingston by Sir James Yeo and Sir George Prevost. For although it had been their original intention to support Vincent before the Americans took Fort George, this new development was seen as a heaven-sent opportunity to destroy Sackets Harbor, the base of Chauncey’s naval power on Lake Ontario, and simultaneously cut the American main supply line to the Niagara, thus creating the third circumstance that was to bedevil General Dearborn.

Sir James Yeo, overall commander of the British and colonial Naval forces in Upper Canada.

Lossing, Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812.

THE BATTLE OF SACKETS HARBOR,

MAY 29, 1813

Following the American victory at York, activities at Sackets Harbor had been closely monitored and reported on by Prevost’s agents, who sent detailed intelligence on the continued build up of troops at the harbour. As a result, when Chauncey and his fleet returned on May 11th, the state of alert at Kingston was raised by that same evening. On May 26th, Sir George Prevost recorded his observations in a report to Earl Bathurst about the current situation:

The enemy, continuing to avail themselves of their naval ascendancy on Lake Ontario, left Sacketts Harbour on the 20th inst. & have appeared off Fort George with sixteen vessels laden with troops, which they disembarked the following day…. Col. Vincent being apprehensive of an immediate attack from a force in number vastly superior to his own, I have advised Commodore Sir J’s Yeo to sail with the vessels ready for service to reconnoitre the enemy’s flotilla, in order that he may form an opinion upon the practicability of conveying about three hundred men, being the whole disposable force I can command at present and which are held in readiness to embark at a moments notice …[3]

Prevost also directed Yeo to make a reconnaissance toward Sackets Harbor, to confirm the absence of any interception threat from Chauncey’s fleet if Yeo’s flotilla sailed with Vincent’s reinforcements. At noon the following day, Yeo returned post-haste to Kingston, bearing news that the enemy’s principal shipbuilding centre was indeed empty of shipping. With the combined reports from Vincent and Chauncey, and looking to take advantage of the moment, Prevost decided to completely revise his campaign strategy and make an immediate surprise strike at Sackets Harbor, before Chauncey’s fleet could return. Without any proper preparations of supply, artillery support, ammunition, food, or even a coherent plan of action, during the course of the afternoon of May 27th every available vessel was assembled and loaded with detachments of troops.*[4]

South East View of Sackett’s Harbour, copied from the original engraving by W.Strickland, 1815. (Below) The same viewpoint in 2012.

Library and Archives Canada, C-8153.

By evening the ad hoc attack force of some 900 men was embarked and the flotilla sailed south to attack Sackets Harbor. Awaiting them was a composite American garrison force that was, according to various sources, comprised of between 1,450 to nearly 2,000 men, drawn from units of regular and militia infantry, artillery, naval crews, U.S. Marines, dockyard workers, and local volunteers.

At dawn the following day, while still some miles from their target and under light intermittent winds, the British flotilla was sighted by a line of three American picket boats left behind by Chauncey for exactly this situation. Swinging about, the Lady of the Lake sailed westward toward the Niagara River to warn Chauncey, while the Fair American and Pert ran south, toward the American base, firing their cannons as an alarm warning. The element of surprise was now lost. In response, without any direct orders for a plan of attack and seeking to maintain the initiative, Major William Drummond (104th) began to independently disembark some of his troops into his landing boats, intending to march overland to initiate the assault. However, in this he was abruptly overruled by Prevost, who ordered the troops re-embarkation and the continuation of the flotillas slow advance toward Sackets Harbor.

By later that morning, the wind had reversed direction and was blowing directly against the flotilla, causing it to lose way. With no hope of making a surprise attack, Prevost called off the landing and ordered the return of the expedition to Kingston. Almost immediately thereafter, however, the winds shifted once again and then subsided, becalming the fleet. At the same time, masthead lookouts reported the approach of a flotilla of eight large bateaux, rowing up from the south and obviously heading for the American harbour with what later was determined to be around 300 men from the Ninth and Twenty-First Regiments under Major Thomas Aspinwall’s command at Oswego. To counter this reinforcement, a gunboat, manned by a detachment from the Glengarry Light Infantry, along with three large canoes filled with Native warriors, were ordered to engage the enemy and, if possible, force them to retreat. Coming under fire from the approaching British boats, far from engaging the smaller enemy units, or retiring as an intact unit, the American boats veered off and scattered, with the majority deliberately running themselves aground on the nearby lakeside shoreline. Whereupon the American troops aboard abandoned their vessels and made for the nearby woods at high speed. Following close behind, the Natives landed and chased after the fleeing Americans. In a series of hand-to-hand engagements in the woods, the Americans were at a serious disadvantage and suffered casualties accordingly, losing over thirty-five men killed to the Natives’ one. In fact, despite their numerical superiority, a large number of American troops were soon seen returning to their fully loaded bateaux, whereupon the boats set course directly for the becalmed British flotilla under a white flag. Upon their arrival, the some 115 troops aboard demanded British protection from the Natives as surrendered prisoners of war.

Despite being pleased by the turn out of events with the convoy, Prevost had nonetheless lost three hours in which to make his assault with favourable winds and his plan for a rapid strike was completely frustrated as the winds died and daylight ended. Faced with the choice of retiring to Kingston without being able to claim to have made any attempt to eliminate what others would consider a vulnerable American base, or attacking what he knew would now be a fully alerted and prepared enemy position, the deliberate surrender of Aspinwall’s troops tipped the balance. Consequently, Prevost reversed his position yet again and ordered the attack to commence at first light the following morning.

On shore, the titular commander of the American base, Lieutenant Colonel Electus Backus (First Light Dragoons), had been making rushed preparations for the British assault from the moment the first alarm was raised. However, despite being a regular army officer, he found himself increasingly superseded by the local militia commander, Brigadier General Jacob Brown. Brown had originally been directed by General Dearborn to only gather a reserve of 300 to 400 militia, in order to “aid” Backus and his official “regular” garrison in case of an attack. Instead, Brown reinterpreted this directive as an authorization and a direct request to take over command of Sackets Harbor and oversee its entire defence.

With the British fleet becalmed offshore as night fell, Brown implemented the defensive plan for the harbour created by Colonel Alexander Macomb in February and took it upon himself to personally direct the placement of each newly arriving detachment of militia troops and make plans for a fighting retreat to the holdout position of Fort Volunteer if the remainder of the positions fell. He also issued directives for all additional local militia units in the immediate region to march to the harbour to bolster the defensive forces. By the early hours of the morning all of the available American forces had been positioned.*[5]

Because much of the immediate coast was composed of sheer rock outcrops and low cliffs, the closest reasonable landing ground not covered by the defensive fortifications and artillery positions were to the south of the harbour at Horse Island. Offshore, the boats had been filled with troops since shortly after 10:00 p.m., awaiting the first light of dawn to begin their approach. As a result, despite the virtually calm wind conditions, a constant cold drizzle and onshore swell had given the exposed troops in the heavily packed small boats an uncomfortable and rocky night, while the local currents scattered the boats from their assigned stations. Once it was light enough to see, the boat crews had the double effort of regaining their stations against the currents and starting the attack on time.

Looking to make their initial landing almost exactly where Brown had predicted, on the mainland to the south side of Horse Island, the British boats soon came under a heavy fire from both the detachments placed on the island, and the militia units on the mainland. Seeing their planned landing ground occupied by the enemy and taking increasing numbers of casualties, the flotilla veered off toward the north side of the island, only to expose themselves to the additional artillery fire of the 32-pounder gun placed at Fort Tompkins atop the bluffs overlooking the harbour. What they did not know was that even this approach had been sufficient to persuade some of Brown’s militiamen to begin deserting.

Continuing to suffer casualties, the leading wave of boats landed on Horse Island, persuading the small detachment of American defenders to retire across the narrow and partially submerged causeway that linked the island to Brown’s prepared entrenchments. Here they joined his remaining force of militia, apparently fully prepared to take on the British from an excellent defensive position. As far as Brown was concerned he had the British penned on an island, with only a single narrow route through which they could approach his prepared earthwork defences, manned with infantry and backed by artillery — everything that a defending commander could wish for to inflict the heaviest casualties on his enemy.

A current (2012) view of Horse Island, as seen from the positions taken by General Brown’s militia forces at the start of the battle. The line of projections in the water that mark the partially submerged remnants of the sandbar causeway are indicated for clarity.

According to General Brown’s later account of the action:

Every exertion was then made [by myself] to inspire my little force with confidence, and assure them that if they would but lay firm and restrain their fire, I was confident that every man must nearly kill his man. I then took my position in the centre by the left of the men at the 6-pounder, directly in front of the column approaching from the island and all was silent with me….[6]

Unfortunately for Brown, the calibre of the men he was facing was that of regular troops, trained for battle and ready to take casualties to achieve their objective. Despite facing the prospect of advancing across an entirely exposed and partially submerged narrow causeway of shingle, sand, and soft mud some 300 yards (275 meters) long and at points less than ten feet (3 meters) wide, before reaching Brown’s prepared entrenchments, the men of the 100th Regiment formed a narrow solid column and, after fixing bayonets and “porting arms,” commenced a disciplined advance across the causeway that steadily increased in pace and culminated in a charging of the bayonets at the last moment. Faced with this onslaught of cold steel, despite having the advantage of firepower and defensive positions, the relatively untrained American militiamen increasingly saw their military role in the conflict as concluded and proceeded in ones, tens, then entire sections to abandon their posts and head for the nearby woods with all speed. Only a few even attempted to fire their weapons, while those who initially stood their ground soon found themselves defending positions that were untenable and either joined the rout or retired back toward the succeeding lines of American troops stationed nearer the Basswood Cantonment barracks and Fort Tompkins.

Previously supremely confident of his self-proclaimed expertise in establishing his defensive positions and seeing his predictions initially fulfilled as to the point of British landing, Brigadier General Brown saw his plans disintegrate before his eyes. In his own words:

Not a shot was fired from their column, the front approaching charging bayonets….

To my utter astonishment, my men arose from their cover and broke & before I could realize the disgraceful scene, there was scarcely a man within several rods of where I stood … I made all the noise I could for my men, put my handkerchief on the point of my sword and made every sort of signal possible that they might notice, but in vain….[7]

Recognizing that the initial encounter was irrevocably lost, Brown quickly mounted his horse and joined his men in putting distance between himself and the enemy.

With the causeway and beachhead secure, the British continued to advance, but were soon slowed by the combined fire of American artillery from Fort Tompkins, the thick entanglements of the lines of abattis flanking the American positions, defensive fire from units of militia that had reformed under cover of the abattis, and a distinct lack of their own artillery support. This latter factor was the combined result of the main British fleet remaining becalmed well out of firing range, the supporting gunboats carrying artillery pieces that could not elevate sufficiently to provide fire support, and the blunder of putting the land artillery pieces in one set of boats and the crews in another, neither of which was anywhere near reaching the shore. There was also an unfortunate instance of friendly fire upon the 104th Regiment by men of the Lower Canada Voltigeur Regiment. This regiment had been one of the last units to land, and under the prevailing conditions of poor visibility (due to the heavy gunsmoke hanging in the damp and still morning air) they had been unable to determine the status of the events taking place before them. As a result, one overly excited officer (Captain William Johnson) did not take the time to properly identify the body of troops to his front, and simply fired his command into the backs of the indistinct shape. He was soon told, in no uncertain and unflattering terms, of his catastrophic blunder by the victim regiment’s commanding officer, Major William Drummond.

Looking to regain the initiative, the main body of attackers, consisting of the 8th (Kings), 100th, Royal Newfoundland, and Glengarry Light Infantry Regiments, led by Colonel Young (8th [King’s] Regiment), moved along the trackway running at the edge of the low cliffs toward the Basswood Cantonment and Fort Tompkins. At the same time a second body, consisting of the 104th, Canadian Voltigeurs, and Native warriors under Major Drummond (104th), were detached with orders to move to their right and approach the village from that quadrant. Shortly thereafter this column also subdivided, with the Voltigeurs and Natives moving even further to the right with orders to press any defenders making a stand among the undergrowth of the woodlands and lines of abattis and secure the flank of the main British thrust. Because of the broken and entangled nature of the terrain on this flank, this force soon found itself broken into small detachments, each taking its own line of advance and fighting its own battle with whatever defenders chose to make a stand..

On the American side of the field, with the militia contingent collapsed and on the run and General Brown nowhere to be found, command of the support troops and remaining defensive positions fell to Lieutenant Colonel Backus once again. Advancing his reserves from the cantonment, and backed by Lieutenant Louis Laval and his 6-pounder artillery piece, as well as some of the retreating militia, Backus established a new line of defensive fire along the inner line of abattis that began to take a steady and increasing toll upon the advancing British force. However, despite putting up a stout and brave resistance, the determined advances of the British on the flanks and equally deadly return fire forced the Americans to begin a fighting retreat back toward Fort Tompkins. Meanwhile, away from the fighting, General Brown later claimed he was otherwise occupied in an attempt to reform some semblance of a militia force that could then rejoin the action and bolster the American line. Unfortunately, he found that there was considerable reluctance on the part of many detachments to rejoin the engagement. While those who did initially appear willing, they quickly dispersed when they encountered parties of British troops, Voltigeurs, and Natives active on that part of the battlefield.

Behind the American lines, the defenders assigned to man the artillery batteries at Navy Point and Fort Volunteer had remained relatively inactive throughout the morning as the increasingly louder sounds of battle drifted back from over the hill, indicating that the British were gaining ground. The two vessels, Fair American and Pert, had already been ordered by Lieutenant Wolcott Chauncey (brother to Commodore Chauncey and senior naval officer at the harbour) to use their long sweep oars to propel themselves out of the harbour and off to the north to avoid being trapped by the British fleet. Now, with the main British flotilla sitting idly well out of firing range, the only British naval presence fell to the gunboats and HMS Beresford, a former merchant topsail schooner adapted to carry ten 18-pounder carronades and two long 9-pounders. This vessel had been laboriously rowed in under fire from the American gun positions until it was positioned off the exposed flank of Fort Tompkins and directly in line with the left flank of the batteries on Navy Point. Once the Beresford opened fire it ignited the Marine Barracks behind the large 32-pounder in Fort Tomkins. So hot did this fire become that the gun had to be abandoned, temporarily ending its damaging bombardment of the British troops. In addition, any rounds that overshot Fort Tompins landed among the crews of the Navy Point batteries, persuading them that Fort Tompkins had fallen and its guns were now trained on them, precipitating a cascade abandonment of these otherwise strong artillery positions by their crews. As a result, the Beresford was able to move round the point and opened fire directly into the heart of the port.

Moving slowly up the bay under oars, the Fair American and Pert exchanged a long-range passing fire with the Beresford but made no attempt to seriously engage her. Under this flanking fire, and with deserters and casualties coming back from both Navy Point and the fighting over the hill indicating that the British had either taken Fort Tompkins or the Americans were abandoning the position, the secondary orders left by Commodore Chauncey and reiterated by Lieutenant Chauncey (now sailing up the bay in the Fair American) were implemented by his subordinates, Master Commandant Leonard, Joseph Gamble, Sailing Master Hutton, and Lieutenant Drury. These prior orders stated that in the event of a British attack actually overrunning the American defences or appearing to carry the garrison a red flag would be raised and then lowered aboard the Fair American. Upon seeing this command, all of the battery artillery positions were to be spiked, the warehouses and other military structures were to be set on fire, and the vessels in the harbour were to be scuttled or fired to deny their use to the enemy. Although there were procedures to prevent any accidental or premature implementation of these last-resort orders, the defeatist reports coming back from the battlefield, plus the subsequent sworn testimonies of those at several locations that the red flag was indeed raised and lowered aboard the Fair American, led to the implementation of the self-destruct instructions. As a result, despite Lieutenant Chauncey’s later vehement denial that he had raised the red-flag order, the torches were set and the buildings began to burn.

Back on the main battlefield, the American defensive line was under great strain and suffering casualties, but it had not broken. However, with all of his available effective troops committed and pushed back to the American entrenchments, it was not long before Lieutenant Colonel Backus decided to order his line to retire on Fort Volunteer. As the American troops began to disengage and pull back, Backus received a mortal wound and command fell upon Major Laval, who confirmed the retreat orders. Inside Fort Tompkins, however, the artillerists manning the guns, backed by the remnants of the Ninth and Twenty-First Infantry, remained in place and continued the engagement, while infantry stragglers and elements of the First Dragoons either joined the now isolated garrison inside the fort or fled through the town, spreading alarm and panic. A British victory and the fall of the harbour seemed inevitable.

What the Americans did not know was that the British offensive was slowly but surely running out of steam, as its casualties mounted. By now the depleted remnants of the British attacking force had finally reached the Basswood Cantonment and, using its cover, had made several attempts to storm the Fort Tompkins position. But after fierce point-blank firing, they were driven off each time by the determined resistance of the ad hoc defending garrison.

Behind the British line, Sir George Prevost had been with the main body throughout the day’s action. As the titular senior officer, he was in command of the entire British battle strategy and execution. Unfortunately, Prevost was first and foremost an administrative commander and, compared to some of his subordinates, relatively inexperienced in battlefield command situations. From his perspective, his command had suffered crippling numbers of casualties from enemy fire while the expected artillery support of his naval contingent was sitting idly offshore, contributing nothing to the attack. To his front, while most of the enemy’s forces had retreated from the field, its principal fortification was stubbornly holding out and blocking his advance to gain his ultimate objective of the harbour. As such, he had had no way of knowing that the Americans on the other side of the rise in ground were in full flight and beginning to do his work of destruction for him. He also had no reconnaissance information about what was occurring on his right flank or in the area beyond his immediate vision, leaving open the potential that the longer he was delayed, the more likely that the Americans were going to receive reinforcements and make a counterattack upon his position. There was also the possibility that because of the delay of over twenty-four hours in making the initial attack, Commodore Chauncey’s fleet might appear on the horizon, cutting off his line of retreat to Kingston aboard his waiting flotilla. Under these conditions, Prevost personally ordered the cessation of the attack and the sounding of the recall for all units.

Despite their shock at hearing the call to retreat at what seemed the moment of victory, the disciplined British soldiers obeyed their orders and began to fall back, surrendering the hard-won ground without a fight. As the British line assembled out of firing range of the American defenders, hoping for the opportunity to make one more concerted attack by the entire remaining force, Major Drummond personally went forward under a flag of truce and called for the Americans to surrender. Despite being almost out of ammunition and with only a few unwounded men to man the walls, Major Laval met Drummond’s call with defiance, correctly assessing that the bugle calls and British withdrawal signalled a weakness in the British resolve to continue the action. Hearing of Laval’s defiance from Major Drummond, Sir George Prevost made the decision to terminate all operations and ordered his force to retreat to their boats. Upon being pressed by Major Drummond to make one final push and not abandon the fruits of the victory already attained, Prevost rebuked his subordinate, reminding him of his primary duty to obey his superiors’ orders and demanded the retreat begin immediately.

Across the field, the British and Canadian units heard the sounds of the bugle calling retreat with varying degrees of astonishment and frustrated anger. Some were in a position to see the dockyards burning and the Americans in full flight. Initially they could not fathom the need for a withdrawal and so only reluctantly obeyed. Other units, interpreting that the order meant American reinforcements were arriving, or a major counterattack was about to take place, made off toward the boats with speed — a situation that soon transmuted their nonexistent danger into a panicked imagining of imminent disaster. This unfettered rumour quickly transmitted itself to other units and turned the orderly withdrawal of Prevost’s forces into a partial rout, with the Americans in Fort Tompkins watching in astonishment as the all-but-triumphant enemy melted away before them.

Back on the landing beaches, discipline amongst the returning troops had almost collapsed. Prompted by the wild rumours, weapons and supplies were abandoned as the men sought places in the shuttle of boats returning to the flotilla. Such was the disorder of this re-embarkation that several units of latecomers and the rearguard found themselves stranded without boats, forcing them to search for their own evacuation transport, which they eventually found, returning to the British flotilla around 9:00 a.m.*[8]

With the British in full retreat, some of the American mounted dragoon commanders, who had played little significant part in the day’s events, wanted to initiate an immediate pursuit. However, to their annoyance, Major Laval vetoed this idea and ordered all units to remain in position and secure the defensive perimeter of the harbour. Likewise, within the harbour itself, once the Beresford was seen to be retreating toward the flotilla, the Fair American and Pert started rowing back toward Fort Volunteer and the docks, while volunteer crews from the yard began to extinguish the fires in order to salvage as much as possible from total destruction. Only then did General Brown reappear on the field. Reviewing the situation and deciding that the British were definitely abandoning the offensive, Brown rode off once again to cajole the reluctant militia formations gathered outside the village to return to their posts and help salvage the dockyard warehouses. He also made sure that he composed the first official report on the day’s action, with copies going to the secretary of war and Governor Tompkins. In these documents, while he gave credit to the strong defensive stand made by the regular army troops at Fort Tompkins, he also phrased the remainder of the affair to reflect the maximum credit upon himself as the architect of what he claimed was a major American victory.

In the aftermath of the battle of Sackets Harbor, both sides were forced to make significant changes in their future campaign strategies. The after-effects of this action also held a significant place upon the future decisions and actions of the senior commanders on both sides of the border.

For Sir George Prevost, his return to Kingston was initially hailed by its citizens as the return of a conquering hero. However, this quickly turned to shock and dismay once they heard the unwelcome news that the expedition had failed. During the next few days this shock changed into a swelling backlash of personal criticism upon Sir George, especially once the eye-witness survivors told their versions of how a hard-won near victory had been turned into a panicked and humiliating defeat at the last moment — apparently exclusively by the commands of their inexperienced battlefield commander. Furthermore, the losses in manpower and resources at Sackets Harbor had compromised the effective fighting capabilities of the vital Kingston position, making it vulnerable to an American attack until reinforcements could be brought up from Lower Canada. Finally, news arrived from General Vincent reporting on the American successful invasion and the British Army’s retreat toward Burlington Heights. This brought the crisis of the threat on the Niagara into instant focus and made the necessity of sending Vincent reinforcements even more vital, even if it meant stripping Kingston of even more of its weakened garrison.

From Prevost’s perspective, it now became necessary, nay vital that he engage in some damage control. In order of priority, he first needed to ensure that his dubious command decisions at Sackets Harbor be seen in the best possible light by his superiors, second that he silence his local critics, and thirdly, that he deal with the crisis on the Niagara. He began by writing his official account of events to Earl Bathurst in London, dated June 1, 1813. This communique (Bulletin No. 64) became a carefully phrased document that began by claiming that the expedition was not an attack to destroy the American base, but merely a deliberate diversionary show of force to disrupt the American activities on the Niagara and assist Vincent. In addition, he overestimated both the American troop numbers and the state of American defences to explain his troop losses and justify his decision to withdraw. He also attempted to shift some of the blame onto Sir James Yeo, by inferring that he (Prevost) knew nothing about the absence of the fleet until late in the battle (when in reality they were fully visible to Sir George throughout the action) and that the heavy troop losses and the failure of the “diversion” were therefore partially due to the failure of the fleet to provide the required artillery support to the landings.

Altho’ as Your Lordship will perceive … the expedition has not been attended with the complete success which has been expected from it, I have the great satisfaction in informing Your Lordship that the courage and patience of the small band of troops employed on this occasion, under circumstances of peculiar hardship and privation, have been exceeded only by their intrepid conduct in the field, forcing a passage at the point of the bayonet through a thickly wooded country, affording constant shelter and strong positions to the enemy, but not a single spot of ground favourable to the operations of disciplined soldiers. The enemy filled the woods with infantry supported by field pieces, and kept up a heavy and destructive fire which could not, however stop the determined advance of His Majesty’s troops … who drove far superior numbers by a spirited charge to seek shelter within their blockhouses and enclosed works. At this moment the enemy were induced to burn their storehouses, but a heavier fire than that of musketry having become necessary in order to force their last position, I had the mortification to learn that the continuation of light and adverse winds had prevented the co-operation of the ships, and that the gunboats were unequal to silence the enemy’s elevated battery or to produce any effect on their blockhouses. Considering it therefore impracticable without such assistance to carry the strong works by which the post was defended, I reluctantly ordered the troops to leave a beaten enemy whom they had driven before them for upwards of three hours, and whom did not venture to offer the slightest opposition to the re-embarkation, which was effected with proper deliberation and in perfect order.[9]

To deal with his local critics, while there is no direct documented evidence that he may have looked to divert criticism away from himself, the following sequence of timing remains suspiciously convenient. Having previously maintained a steadfast support of Major General Sir Roger Sheaffe against the complaints of those same civilian critics, Prevost suddenly reversed his position and issued the following terse statement in the publicly viewed General Orders, dated June 6, 1813.

Major-General De Rottenburg will deliver over the command of the troops and the civil administration of the Province of Lower Canada to Major-General Glasgow, and is to arrive at Kingston on the 20th inst. Major-General Sir R. Sheaffe will meet Major General De Rottenburg at Cornwall on the 15th and from thence proceed to Montreal to assume the command of the troops in that district.[10]

Interestingly, although Prevost had made a private mention of the need to make this replacement prior to the Sackets Harbor engagement (bulletin No. 63 to Earl Bathurst) on May 26, he had also specifically stated that this would only take place once the military situation on the Niagara had settled down, he had completed his reinforcement of General Vincent, and had received an approval confirmation of his intention from London. Now the change was pushed through without delay, and Prevost did not see fit to include this very significant item of news in his subsequent official communiqués to Earl Bathurst. In fact, it was not until Bulletin No. 72 dated June 24, 1813, after writing: “I have the honour to transmit to Your Lordship a copy of a public declaration given out by the American commandant of Fort Erie, after the enemy had taken possession of that post, and the proclamation which I deemed it necessary to issue in consequence of it,”[11] that Prevost dismissingly broached the subject of his unilateral entire change in command in Upper Canada.

I avail myself of this opportunity of informing Your Lordship that finding upon my arrival at this place [which, in fact, had been almost two months earlier] that Major-General Sir Roger Sheaffe had altogether lost the confidence of the Province by the measures he had pursued for its defence, I deemed it most conducive to the good of the public service to remove that officer to Montreal and to Substitute Major-General De Rottenburg in his place.[12]

Finally, to deal with the issue on the Niagara, Prevost began to muster a relief force and supplies that would need transportation aboard Yeo’s fleet if it was to arrive with any hope of being in time to assist Vincent. Unfortunately, Yeo’s co-operation on the matter was something of a question at

that moment.

For Sir James Yeo, the expedition to Sackets Harbor had been a severe test of his command abilities. To his credit he had successfully mounted an amphibious expedition in less than twenty-four hours, only a fortnight after taking up his new command, and with no real knowledge of the capabilities of his ships or crews. He had maintained the integrity of his fleet under variable weather conditions, suffered negligible losses during the course of the action, and brought his command home intact. On the other hand, while he was perhaps justified in exercising a degree of caution in view of his unfamiliarity with the waters, the uncertain weather, and the variable winds his fleet experienced, the fact that he personally went ashore and participated in the action, instead of supervising the movement of his fleet inshore to bombard the American positions, definitely left Yeo open to criticism — which was not helped by Prevost’s version of events and implied blame. In the aftermath of the events of May 28th, a series of communications took place between the two commanders, as well as from the two to their masters in London, about the relative degrees of responsibility for the failure of the expedition. This inevitably cooled and then soured relations between Sir George and Sir James for some time to come — just when the maximum degree of support and co-operation was needed in the British camp.

For Commodore Chauncey, when the Lady of the Lake arrived at the Niagara River (late on May 29th) bearing the alarming news that the British fleet had sailed, he was placed in a dilemma. The report did not contain any detailed information about the destination of the British flotilla, but it was evident that Sackets Harbor was a potential priority target. On the other hand, there was also the possibility that Yeo’s goal was to break through with reinforcements for Vincent and take on the American fleet while it was hamstrung in its manoeuvring by the need to maintain contact with Dearborn’s land forces. In addition, by his own orders, several vessels had been detached to make reconnaissance sweeps around the west end of the lake, thus leaving his fighting force reduced in firepower if the British appeared. Consequently, Chauncey notified Dearborn that effective immediately, he intended to leave and seek out the enemy fleet before returning to protect his naval base. He also pressured Dearborn to supply troops to augment the Sackets Harbor garrison. In reply, Dearborn detached 200 men, under Colonel Macomb, to travel with Chauncey, while Lieutenant Colonel Ripley and his regiment were ordered to march to the harbour by way of Oswego. However, despite the urgency of the moment, Chauncey was forced to wait over twenty-four hours until his vessels returned before sailing north toward York and the northern shore of Lake Ontario — it being the most likely route Yeo and Proctor would take if their intention was to link up with Vincent. When no enemy appeared, Chauncey set course for Kingston and Sackets Harbor with all sail. After locating the enemy back in port at Kingston, Chauncey reached his base late in the afternoon of June 1st.

Upon his arrival, Commodore Chauncey found that while most of the dockyard and the hull of his new warship had been saved from destruction, the same could not be said for the barracks and warehouses on Navy Point, which not only contained the fittings and supplies that were needed to finish her off and make her fit for sea but also the entire stock of captured supplies from York. Although Brigadier General Brown was in titular command, the post was in a state of virtual anarchy with no one, least of all Brown, taking the responsibility to coordinate repairs and see to the needs of the numerous detachments of militia and regulars who had descended on the port in the aftermath of the alert. In fact, within a short time after Chauncey and Macomb’s arrival, Brown had not only relinquished his command to Macomb but, instead of remaining to support the two officers, immediately left for his own community at Brownsville, a little way up the shoreline — leaving the two returnees to clean up the chaos of the moment, while he made sure that his version of the events surrounding the battle became public knowledge through leaks to the press.

While Colonel Macomb took charge of the reorganization of the base’s defences, Commodore Chauncey was left to deal with the political fallout of the near disaster and the inevitable blame game that flared up between the various participants. Major Laval found himself criticized and condemned by other officers for ordering the retreat to Fort Volunteer when the Americans seemed defeated and then not allowing a pursuit of the British when they, in turn, retreated. Similarly Lieutenant Chauncey, along with his subordinates Master Commandant Leonard, Joseph Gamble, Sailing Master Hutton, and Lieutenant Drury, were all accused of various offences. These included cowardice and dereliction of duty (for having the warehouses burned) and permitting the defences at Navy Point to be abandoned without any direct attack taking place on that position in contravention of orders.

Left with no option but to convene a court of inquiry, Commodore Chauncey personally selected the judges. Once empanelled, the judges quickly concluded that Major Laval had been justified in his command decisions and the officer was acquitted on all charges. In the case of Lieutenant Chauncey and his subordinates, however, more complicated issues were involved and testimonies were entered clearly implicating all four men. Suspiciously, the panel’s subsequent findings exonerated the lieutenant but found the remainder culpable. This led to the dismissal of Leonard, Gamble, and Hutton. In the case of Lieutenant Drury, while the initial findings of Chauncey’s hand-picked inquiry also held him guilty, testimonies given at his subsequent (and more independent) court martial not only contradicted the prior findings but also began to expose additional damaging details of Lieutenant Chauncey’s behaviour, orders, and actions during the day’s events. Before this line of inquiry had continued too far the court was summarily adjourned and almost immediately came back with a finding of not guilty on the major counts of disobedience of orders and cowardice. However, Drury was censured on a lesser infraction, leading to a private reprimand being put on his record by the commodore and, during the course of the following year, was repeatedly passed over for promotion while still under the command of that senior officer.

In addition, for Commodore Chauncey the near catastrophe of losing his new and still unnamed vessel, not to mention his entire base of operations, coupled with the actual loss of all the supplies intended to fit her out, left him determined to secure her completion and inclusion in his Lake Ontario fleet. Despite the fact that obtaining replacement supplies and completing the vessel would take at least a month or more, Chauncey made the decision that not only was he going to remain at Sackets Harbor to personally oversee the project to its completion, but that his entire fleet would remain there as well, for protection. Despite requests and then pleas from his captains to let them venture out under separate or independent commands to harass the enemy, Chauncey was determined that only he would lead his fleet and restricted them to either remaining at the harbour or being dispatched as picket vessels to guard the approaches to the harbour. As a result, the throttle-hold the Americans had on the British supply lines was suddenly and unilaterally released — a situation that the British were quick to take advantage of.

For Brigadier General Jacob Brown, the aftermath of the battle at Sackets Harbor was one of opportunity and advantage. Easily the most adept “political” general in American service, he avoided the negative inferences and implications revealed at the court of inquiry by making sure that he remained distinctly absent from the scene. He also made sure that his official reports were copied and distributed to most of the relevant political personalities in Washington, D.C., as well as the press. As a result, his credentials as the “saviour” of Sackets Harbor became such a matter of “known fact” that those who believed anything different found it in their own best interests not to challenge the instant celebrity of Brown, at least for the moment.

In addition, although Brigadier General Brown had already declined a previous official offer of a transfer from the militia to the regular army (because under the standard terms of this kind of transfer it would necessitate him losing his rank of general and being reduced to colonel), Brown used his celebrity status to parlay the “victory” into getting a transfer directly to the regular army without any loss of rank or seniority. This singular occurrence, made at the direction of the president, not only broke precedence and military protocols but was also, naturally, taken as a “slap in the face” for those regulars who were nominally next in line for promotion. This special treatment led to a strong degree of resentment against Brown within the corps of regular army officers. A resentment that was still very evident more than a year later when he commanded the Northern Army on the Niagara.

As for the effect the battle of Sackets Harbor had on the course of the campaign to control the Niagara frontier — it took less than a fortnight before the pendulum began to swing in an entirely new direction, halting the sweep of American victories thus far achieved.