Читать книгу Communicating in Risk, Crisis, and High Stress Situations: Evidence-Based Strategies and Practice - Vincent T. Covello - Страница 58
3.4.4 Risk Perception Theory
ОглавлениеRisk perceptions are the subjective judgments people make about the characteristics and severity of a risk. Risk perceptions are also subject to the beliefs a person holds regarding a risk, including the definition, probability, and outcome of the risk. Risk perception theory recognizes that risk is not an objective phenomenon perceived in the same way by all interested parties. Instead, it is a social and cultural construct with its roots deeply embedded in personal experiences and a specific social, economic, political, and cultural context. A variety of scientific, psychological, social, economic, political, and cultural factors determine which risks will ultimately be selected for individual, group, and societal attention and concern.
Evidence about the magnitude of possible adverse consequences is only one of many factors influencing public decisions about the acceptability of a risk. The level of risk, as assessed by technical, engineering, and scientific professionals, is only one among several variables that determines acceptability. Deciding which risks are acceptable is typically based more on risk perception factors than on scientific facts. Much of the risk communication literature focuses on these risk perceptions factors
Risk perception factors profoundly affect the ability of people to make informed decisions about risk‐related issues. Table 3.6 contains a list of the 20 most important risk perception factors. Each factor is described in more detail below.
1 Trust in responsible authorities and institutions: People are often more concerned about activities or actions where the responsible assessor or manager is perceived to be untrustworthy (e.g., individuals, organizations, or institutions that have a clear conflict of interest) than they are about activities or actions where the responsible assessor or manager is perceived to be trustworthy (e.g., trust in first responders, such as fire department personnel).
2 Voluntariness: People are often more concerned about activities and actions that are perceived to be involuntary, coerced, or imposed on them (e.g., exposure to chemicals or radiation from an accident at an industrial facility) than about activities or actions that are perceived to be voluntary or chosen (e.g., smoking, sunbathing, talking on a cellphone while driving, or mountain climbing).
3 Scope/catastrophic potential: People are typically more concerned about activities and actions perceived to be cataclysmic and where harm, fatalities, and injuries are grouped in time and space (e.g., harm, fatalities, and injuries resulting from a major release of toxic chemicals or radiation) than about activities or actions where harm, fatalities, and injuries are scattered, occur over a long period, or are random in time and space (e.g., automobile accidents).
4 Familiarity/exotic: People are typically more concerned about activities or actions perceived to cause harm and perceived to be unfamiliar (e.g., leaks of chemicals or radiation from waste disposal facilities; outbreaks of unfamiliar infectious diseases such as Zika, West Nile Virus, and Ebola) than about activities or actions that are familiar and routine (e.g., household accidents).
5 Understanding/visibility: People are often more concerned about activities or actions perceived to be characterized by invisible or poorly understood exposure mechanisms or processes (e.g., long‐term exposure to low doses of toxic chemicals or radiation) than about activities or actions perceived to be characterized by visible and apparently well‐understood exposure mechanisms or processes (e.g., pedestrian accidents or slipping on ice).
6 Uncertainty: People are often more concerned about activities or actions that are perceived to cause harm and are perceived to have unknown causes or uncertain risks (e.g., mysterious outbreaks of illnesses; risks from a radioactive waste facility designed to last 20,000 years) than about activities or actions that are perceived to cause harm and that are perceived to have known causes and for which there are relatively certain risk‐related data (e.g., actuarial data on automobile accidents).
7 Controllability (personal): People are often more concerned about activities or actions that are perceived as outside their control (e.g., flying in an airplane; exposure to releases of toxic chemicals or radiation from an accident at an industrial facility) than about activities or actions that are perceived to be under their personal control (e.g., driving an automobile or riding a bicycle).
8 Effects on children: People are often more concerned about activities or actions that are perceived to adversely affect children or specifically put children in the way of harm or risk (e.g., asbestos in school buildings; milk contaminated with radiation or toxic chemicals; children’s food contaminated with pesticide residues; pregnant women exposed to radiation or toxic chemicals) than about activities or actions engaged in by adults and that are not perceived to specifically put children in the way of harm or risk (indoor air pollution in office buildings).
9 Effects manifestation: People are often more concerned about risks that have delayed effects (e.g., the development of cancer after exposure to low doses of chemicals or radiation) than about risks that have immediate effects (e.g., poisonings).
10 Effects on future generations: People are often more concerned about activities or actions perceived to pose significant risks to future generations (e.g., genetic effects related to exposure to toxic chemicals or radiation) than activities or actions perceived to pose no special significant risks to future generations (e.g., skiing accidents).
11 Victim identity: People are often more concerned about activities or actions that are perceived to cause harm and that impact identifiable victims or a named person (e.g., a worker exposed to high levels of toxic chemicals or radiation; a child who has fallen in a well) than about risks that are statistical and impact persons that are nameless or faceless (e.g., statistical deaths related to automobile accidents).
12 Pleasurable/Dreaded: People are often more concerned about activities or actions that are perceived as unpleasant, dreaded, or evoke a response of fear, terror, or anxiety (e.g., exposure to radiation or chemicals that can cause cancer or birth defects) than to activities or action risks that are perceived to be pleasurable, not especially dreaded, or do not evoke a special response of fear, terror or anxiety (e.g., using recreational drugs, common colds, or household accidents).
13 Awareness/Media attention: People are often more concerned about activities or actions that are perceived to cause potential harm and for which there is high public awareness and media attention (e.g., cancer, airplane crashes, hazardous waste sites, accidents at industrial or nuclear power facilities) than about activities or actions that are perceived to cause harm but for which there are little awareness and media attention (e.g., on‐the‐job accidents).
14 Fairness: People are often more concerned about activities or actions that are perceived to be characterized by an inequitable or unfair distribution of risks, costs, and benefits (e.g., inequities related to the siting of waste disposal or industrial facilities) than about activities or actions perceived to be characterized by an equitable distribution of risks, costs, or benefits (e.g., flu vaccination).
15 Benefits: People are often more concerned about activities or actions that are perceived to have unclear, questionable, or diffused benefits (e.g., waste disposal facilities) than about activities or actions that are perceived to have obvious benefits (e.g., elective surgery).
16 Reversibility: People are often more concerned about activities or actions that are perceived to have potentially permanent adverse outcomes or effects (e.g., nuclear war) than about activities or actions perceived to have potentially reversible adverse outcomes or effects (e.g., injuries from most sports or household accidents).
17 Personal stake: People are often more concerned about activities or actions that they perceive place them, or their families or friends, personally and directly in the way of harm or risk (e.g., living near an industrial facility with potentially hazardous air emissions) than about activities or actions that do not place them or their families and friends personally and directly in the way of harm or risk (e.g., disposal of hazardous waste in remote places).
18 Nature of evidence: People are often more concerned about activities or actions that are based on risk assessments from human studies (e.g., risk assessments based on adequate exposure data of humans) than about activities or actions based on risk assessments from nonhuman studies (e.g., laboratory studies of the effects of potentially hazardous chemicals using mice or rats).
19 Morality: People are often more concerned about activities or actions that are perceived to violate culturally based principles of morality and ethics (e.g., raising the price of a life‐saving prescription drug to a very high level) than about activities or actions that are perceived to be consistent with culturally based principles of morality and ethics (e.g., lying about the nationality or ethnicity of a child to protect the child from those who want to do harm because of child’s nationality or ethnicity).
20 Human vs. natural origin: People are often more concerned about activities and actions that are perceived to cause harm and are perceived to have their origin in human actions and failures (e.g., accidents, leaks, and spills at waste disposal or industrial sites caused by negligence, inadequate safeguards, inadequate supervision, or operator error) than about activities and actions that are perceived to cause harm and that are perceived to be caused by acts of nature or God (e.g., exposure to sunshine or cosmic rays).
Table 3.6 Risk perceptions (fear factors).
Factor | Conditions associated with higher perceived risks, increased concerns, greater fears | Conditions associated with lower perceived risks, decreased concerns, and greater fears |
---|---|---|
Trust Voluntariness | Lack of trust in responsible persons Involuntary/coerced/imposed | Trust in responsible persons Voluntary/chosen |
Scope/catastrophic potential | High catastrophic potential | Low catastrophic potential |
Familiarity Understanding/visibility | Unfamiliar/exotic Invisible/mechanisms or process not understood | Familiar/routine Visible/mechanisms or process understood |
Uncertainty | Effects and outcomes unknown or uncertain | Effects and outcomes known |
Controllability (personal) | Effects and outcomes uncontrollable by the person | Effects and outcomes controllable by the person |
Effects on children | Children specifically at risk | Children not specifically at risk |
Effects manifestation | Delayed effects | Immediate effects |
Effects on future generations | Significant threat to future generations | Little or no threat to future generations |
Victim identity/specificity | Identifiable and/or specific person or victims | Nameless, faceless, or statistical victims |
Pleasurable/dreaded | Outcomes and effects not pleasurable/dreaded | Outcomes and effects pleasurable/not dreaded |
Awareness/media attention | Much awareness/media attention | Little awareness/media attention |
Fairness/equity | Inequitable distribution of risks and benefits | Equitable distribution of risks and benefits |
Benefits | Unclear benefits | Clear benefits |
Reversibility Personal stake Nature of evidence Morality | Effects and outcome irreversible Direct and significant perceived personal risk or threat Evidence from human studies Immoral/callous/unethical | Effects and outcomes reversible Little or no perceived significant personal risk or threat Evidence from laboratory studies Moral/ethical |
Origin | Caused by human actions or failures | Caused by acts of nature or God |
Risk perception theory states that risks are more worrisome, more fearful, and less acceptable if they are perceived as having the characteristics listed in Table 3.6 and described above. Risk perception theory counters the conventional notion that “facts speak for themselves.” People commonly accept high risks but also become outraged over much less likely risks.
Risk perception factors can change concerns, perceptions of risk, fear, and perceived dangers exponentially. They explain the aversion of parts of the public toward activities and technologies such as nuclear power, required childhood vaccinations, and genetically modified food.
Perception factors also help to explain phenomena, such as the “not in my back yard” (NIMBY) and the “locally unwanted land use” (LULU) responses to many chemicals, nuclear, and other industrial facilities. For example, residents in communities where industrial facilities exist or are planned often become outraged if they believe government and industry officials:
1 have excluded them from meaningful participation in the decision‐making process;
2 have denied them the resources needed to evaluate or monitor health, safety, or environmental risks;
3 have denied them the opportunity to give their “informed consent” to management decisions that affect their lives or property;
4 have imposed or want to impose upon them facilities that provide few local economic benefits;
5 have imposed or want to impose upon them facilities that entail high costs to the community (e.g., adverse health, safety, wildlife, recreational, tourism, property value, traffic, noise, odor, scenic view, and quality of life effects);
6 have imposed or want to impose on them facilities that provide most of the benefits to those other than the community hosting the facility; and
7 have dismissed their opinions, fears, and concerns as irrational and irrelevant.
Critical to resolving NIMBY, LULU, and related risk‐related controversies is the recognition that a fairly distributed risk is more acceptable than an unfairly distributed one. A risk entailing significant benefits to the affected parties is more acceptable than a risk with no benefits. A risk where no alternatives exist is more acceptable than a risk an alternative technology could eliminate. A risk the affected have control over is more acceptable than a risk beyond their control. A risk that the parties at risk assess and decide voluntarily to accept is more acceptable than a risk that is imposed upon them.
Risk is multidimensional; size is only one of the relevant dimensions. If the validity of this point is accepted, then many risk communication strategies present themselves. Factors such as fairness, benefits, and voluntariness are often equal or more important to the public in judging the acceptability of a risk than the risk data provided by technical, engineering, and scientific professionals. Therefore, efforts to engage stakeholders and make a risk more fair, beneficial, or voluntary are as appropriate in making a risk more acceptable as efforts to make a risk technically smaller. Similarly, because control is important in determining the acceptability of a risk, efforts to engage people and share power, such as by establishing citizen or worker advisory committees or by supporting third‐party research, audits, inspections, and monitoring, are as appropriate in making a risk more acceptable as efforts to make a risk technically smaller.
In summary, deciding what level of risk ought to be acceptable is not a technical question but a social, cultural, and value question. People vary in how they assess risk acceptability. They weigh the various factors according to their own values, sense of risk, and perceived stake in the outcome. Because acceptability is a matter of values and opinions, and because values and opinions differ, debates about risk are often debates about values, accountability, and control.