Читать книгу Anuario de arbitraje 2017 - Mª José Menéndez Arias - Страница 19

El segundo gran deber del árbitro es hacer todo lo posible para dictar un laudo válido, es decir que resista una acción de anulación y que sea ejecutable, en primer lugar, en la sede y, en la medida de lo posible, en las demás jurisdicciones en las que sea previsible que la parte que haya ganado vaya a querer ejecutarlo(37).

Así se establece, por ejemplo, en el artículo 41 del reglamento CCI:

«En todos los casos no previstos expresamente en el Reglamento, la Corte y el tribunal arbitral procederán según el espíritu de sus disposiciones y esforzándose siempre para que el laudo sea susceptible de ejecución legal».

El artículo 2.2 del reglamento de la SCC se pronuncia en parecidos términos:

«In all matters not expressly provided for in these Rules, the SCC, the Arbitral Tribunal and the parties shall act in the spirit of these Rules and shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that any award is legally enforceable».

También lo hace el artículo 32.2 del reglamento de la LCIA, aunque por referencia solo a la sede:

«For all matters not expressly provided in the Arbitration Agreement, the LCIA Court, the LCIA, the Registrar, the Arbitral Tribunal and each of the parties shall act at all times in good faith, respecting the spirit of the Arbitration Agreement, and shall make every reasonable effort to ensure that any award is legally recognized and enforceable at the arbitral seat».

Se trata, naturalmente, de una obligación de medios, no de resultado; además, éste, el resultado, será más fácilmente conseguible en la sede que en otras jurisdicciones.

Como dice Redfern(38):

«Some rules of arbitration contain an express provision that the arbitrator shall «make every effort» to ensure that the award is enforceable. This is an obligation to use best endeavors, rather than an obligation to secure a result. Indeed, it is difficult to see how it could be otherwise. The most conscientious arbitrator in the world cannot guarantee that his or her award is enforceable in whatever country enforcement may be sought. The most that can be expected is that the arbitrator will do his best to ensure that the appropriate procedure is followed and, above all, that each party is given a fair hearing».

Por su parte, Pérez Lozada afirma lo siguiente(39):

«Nevertheless, the duty to render enforceable awards is subject to limitations.

The first one derivers from a common (wrong) assumption that enforceability is a fully determinable concept. During arbitration, often parties do not have a clear idea of where to enforce a winning award. Even assuming that there are few locations where an award can be enforced, the assets of a losing party could easily be relocated to another jurisdiction(s), at any time. Hence in many cases, arbitral tribunals are ill prepared to assume a duty to render enforceable awards.

Secondly, the enforceability of an award does not only depend on the diligence of an arbitrator and thus, it can have diverse results in different jurisdictions; depending on the public policy or arbitrability criteria of the seat and/or of the country of enforcement».

Siendo importante que el laudo sea válido y ejecutable en todas las jurisdicciones imaginables, lo es sobre todo que lo sea en la sede, razón por la que el árbitro deberá ser especialmente cuidadoso (i) con lo que prevea el derecho de la sede y (ii) con la doctrina de los tribunales de esta en materia de cuestiones preliminares.

Como dice la recomendación 3 del informe sobre litispendencia y arbitraje de la International Law Association («ILA»)(40):

«The Committee was mindful that an arbitral tribunal should apply the law and respect the practice at the place of arbitration, not least because the courts of that country will ultimately have the power to set aside the tribunal’s award and are very unlikely to allow inconsistent decisions on jurisdiction to stand. Accordingly, if the law and practice at the place of arbitration prescribes that it is for the tribunals to defer to the courts on issues of jurisdiction, then the tribunal should act accordingly».

Es interesante a este respecto la sentencia de la Corte de Apelación del Quinto Circuito de EE UU (caso Karaha Bodas Co. contra Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara del año 2004):

«Under the [New York] Convention, “the country in which, or under the law of which, [an] award was made” is said to have primary jurisdiction over the arbitration award. All other signatory States are secondary jurisdictions, in which parties can only contest whether that State should enforce the arbitral award».

Es cierto, sin embargo, que la anulación en la sede puede tener remedio, pues en ocasiones se han ejecutado laudos anulados, gracias a que el artículo V.1.e del Convenio de Nueva York no obliga a denegar la ejecución de un laudo anulado (solo permite hacerlo). Francia es una jurisdicción especialmente flexible en este punto, como es conocido. Y, recientemente, se ha sabido de un laudo anulado en Méjico, pero ejecutado en los EE UU (Corporación Mexicana de Mantenimiento Integral, S. de R.L. de C.V. contra Pemex de 2016).

Es muy interesante, por último, lo que a este respecto se dice en el laudo parcial dictado en Salini:

«A generally accepted principle of international arbitration […] compels the Arbitral Tribunal to make every effort to ensure that any award it renders is enforceable at law. In this context, complying with the law and the judicial decisions of the seat is clearly an important objective, in light of the fact that the courts have the power to set aside an award rendered at the country.

[…]

The Tribunal would be slow to render an award that is likely to be set aside at the seat, taking into account the principle according to which the Tribunal must make every effort to render an enforceable award».

Sin embargo, el deber de dictar un laudo válido y ejecutable no es absoluto; por encima de él está, como ya hemos dicho, el primero de los deberes del árbitro, que es dictar un laudo justo.

Como se dijo en Salini:

«This does not mean, however, that the arbitral tribunal should simply abdicate to the courts of the seat the tribunal’s own judgement about what is fair and right in the arbitral proceedings. In the event that the arbitral tribunal considers that to follow a decision of a court would conflict fundamentally with the tribunal’s understanding of its duty to the parties, derived from the parties’ arbitration agreement, the tribunal must follow its own judgement, even if that requires non-compliance with a court order. […]

To make every effort to render an enforceable award does not oblige an arbitral tribunal to render awards that are fundamentally unfair or otherwise improper. An arbitral tribunal should not go so far as to frustrate the arbitration agreement itself in the interests of ensuring enforceability. Such an outcome would be, at least, a paradox».