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To run a state, is a costly undertaking. Not all (if any) states can pay the price out of their own pocket. What is needed, is additional money which usually comes from within the state in form of taxes. However, if that does not suffice, support has to come from outside. The traditional means for that is a loan –whereby this term is meant here to be a generic one rather than the technical contract type of private law. This is where the creditors of the state enter the stage– at least those addressed in this paper85. They are traditionally categorized pursuant to the remedies available in case of the state’s default. Those remedies exist for other states as lenders in the shape of the so-called Paris Club, for private banks in the shape of the London Club. Multilateral institutions such as the IMF, World Bank etc. claim to have the privilege of priority repayment. The rest of creditors, the by far biggest bulk of personal and legal persons and called Private Sector enjoys no procedure at all.

It is primarily here where the discussion about the introduction of an orderly proceeding for defaulting states comes into play – after an astonishing and unintelligible long period of lawyers’ ignoring the problem. The short battle between the statutory vs. contractual approach right at the beginning of this millennium was decided in favor of latter. What has evolved, therefore, on the international arena since then to overcome the Private Sector’s deficit is the refinement of a contractual clause dealing with collective actions. It is fair to predict that it will take another series of disastrous sovereign defaults before the state community will be ready to leave this path of alleged wisdom and to turn to a solution which is better suited to address the complexities of a bankrupt state by taking into consideration more than just the mere debtor-creditor relationship.

(1) Cf. Inst. 3.13 pr. Note that the Latin word “obligare” means originally “to bind someone” – using a somewhat less aggressive word picture than the “vinculum” (chain).

(2) From the abundance of literature on this subject, Cf. Winkler, Zeit und Recht – kritische Anmerkungen zur Zeitgebundenheit des Rechts und des Rechtsdenkens, 1995; Dürig, Zeit und Rechtsgleichheit, in: Gernhuber (ed.): Tradition und Fortschritt im Recht. Festschrift der Tübinger Juristenfakultät, Tübingen 1977, p. 21 ff.; Epstein, The Temporal Dimension in Tort Law, 53 The University of Chicago Law Review, 1986, p. 1175 ff.; idem, Past and Future: The Temporal Dimension in the Law of Property, 64 Washington University Law Quarterly, 1986, p. 662 ff.; von Gierke, Dauernde Schuldverhältnisse, Jherings Jahrbücher für die Dogmatik des bürgerlichen Rechts 1914, p. 355 ff.; Großfeld, Zeit im Recht, Japanstudien 2 1991, p. 17 ff.; Häberle, Zeit und Verfassung, in: Zeitschrift für Politik 1974, 111 ff.; Husserl, Recht und Zeit, 1955 Frankfurt/M.; Kloepfer, Verfassung und Zeit, Der Staat 1974, p. 457 ff.

(3) For a more accurate description of this evolution, Cf. Paulus, Ausdifferenzierungen im Insolvenz- und Restrukturierungsrecht zum Schutz der Gläubiger, Juristenzeitung (JZ) 2019, p. 11 ff. (in Portuguese: A diferenciação no Direito Falimentar e o Direito de Reestruturação do credor, 22 Revista de Direito Civil Contemporâneo (RDCC) 2020, 263 ff.).

(4) Interesting observations of a non-lawyer by Safranski, Die Zeit – was sie mit uns macht, 2015, p. 115 ff.

(5) A similar mechanism is to be found at the discharge rules, Cf. art. 20 f. of the Preventive Restructuring Framework Directive EU 2019/1023; on this Cf. Paulus/Dammann (eds.), European Preventive Restructuring, 2021, artt. 20, 21 (commentary); or in the admissibility of a condition in a contract: in German dogmatics a condition is defined as a “future uncertain event”.

(6) Some hints into this direction at Dutta, Warum Erbrecht?, 2012, p. 477 ff.

(7) For similar deliberations in a slightly different context in ancient Rome on modicum tempus Cf. Klingenberg, Das modicum-Kriterium, Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für Rechtsgeschichte, rom. Abt., 126, 2009, p. 187, 231 ff., 274 ff.

(8) On the eminent economic importance of risk Cf. Sinn, Risiko als Produktionsfaktor, Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 1986, 557 ff.

(9) On this, just see Martha, International Financial Institutions and Claims of Private Parties – Immunity Obliges, in: The World Bank Legal Review 3, International Financial Institutions and Global Legal Governance, 2012, p. 93 ff.; M.J.Müller, Staatsbankrott und private Gläubiger, 2015, p. 188 ff.

(10) Cf. Paulus, Iniciativas legales para paliar el sobreendeudamiento de los Estados, Anuario de Derecho Concursal 16, 2009, 9 ff.

(11) On the Greek crisis just see the contributions of Waibel, Burda, Lipp, Hofmann, Chiotellis in: Paulus (ed.), A Debt Restructuring Mechanism for Sovereigns – Do we Need a Legal Procedure?, 2014, p. 3 ff., 21 ff., 35 ff., 43 ff., 99 ff.; Paulus, Un procedimiento da “resolvencia” para Grecia:?Habría funcionado?, in: Martín/Tirado (eds.), Grecia: aspectos políticos y jurídico-economícos de la crisis, 2015, p. 279 ff.; Buchheit/Gulati, How to Restructure Greek Debt, 2010, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1603304; but see, additionally, Levandis, The Greek Foreign Debt and the Great Powers 1821-1898, 1944.

(12) On this, Cf. Holtfrerich, Bewältigung der deutschen Staatsbankrotte 1918 und 1945, in: Kantzenbach (ed.), Staatsüberschuldung, 1996, p. 27 ff.

(13) Cf. in this context Buiter/Rahbari, Why Governments Default, in: Lastra/Buchheit (eds.), Sovereign Debt Management, 2014, 19.01 ff.

(14) Cf. Fatás/Ghosh/Panizza/Presbitero, The Motive to Borrow, in: Abbas/Pienkowski/Rogoff (eds.), Sovereign Debt – A Guide for Economists and Practitioners, 2020, p. 102 ff.

(15) Just see Isensee, Die Insolvenzunfähigkeit des Staates, in: Heintzen/Kruschwitz (eds.), Unternehmen in der Krise, 2004, p. 227 ff.

(16) On the interwovenness of Sovereignty and monetary independence Pistor, From Territorial to Monetary Sovereignty, 18 Theoretical Inquiries, 2017, p. 491 ff.

(17) For Austria Cf. the haunting description of those days in Stefan Zweig’s autobiography “The World of Yesterday”.

(18) On this, just see Kelton, The Deficit Myth –Modern Monetary Theory– and How to Build a Better Economy, 2020; Bofinger, Was immer es braucht, available at https://www.ipg-journal.de/regionen/global/artikel/was-immer-es-braucht-4219/.

(19) Cf. Kratz/Feng/Wright, New Data on the “Debt Trap” Question, from April 29, 2019, available at: https://rhg.com/research/new-data-on-the-debt-trap-question; Hurley/Morris/Portelance, Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, from March 2018, CDG Policy Paper 121 (Cf. particularly p. 16 ff.). See also fn. 27 infra.

(20) Cf. Herman, Introduction: The Players and the Game of Sovereign Debt, 21 Ethics & International Affairs (2007), p. 5 ff.

(21) Cf. Recital 13 of the ESM Treaty.

(22) Cf. www.Clubdeparis.org. On this Club, Cf. Cosio-Pascal, The emerging of a multilateral forum for debt restructuring: the Paris Club, UNCTAD Discussion papers No. 192, November 2008; Reinisch, Völkerrechtlicher Staateninsolvenzmechanismus, in: Kodek / Reinisch (eds.), Staateninsolvenz, 2nd ed., 2012, p. 163 ff, 165 f.

(23) On this particular feature Cf. Westbrook, The Control of Wealth in Bankruptcy, 82 Tex.L.Rev. 795 ff. (2004); Paulus, The ever lasting power game between creditors and debtors in credit relationships, in: Veiga Copo / Martínez Munoz (Hgg.), El Acreedor en el Derecho Concursal y Preconursal a la luz del Texto Refundido de la Ley Concursal, 2020, p. 39 ff.

(24) On what follows see already Paulus, Staatsschulden –COVID 19– Pleite. Was bedeutet Schulden heute?, Festschrift für Werner Ebke, 2021, p. 697 ff.

(25) Cf. UNCTAD Principles on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing from 10 January 2012, available at: https://unctad.org/system/files/official-document/gdsddf2012misc1_en.pdf. On this, see, e.g., Buchheit/Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, UNCTAD discussion paper no. 198 from April 2010; Espósito/Li/Bohoslavsky, Sovereign Financing and International Law, 2013; Bohoslavsky/Li, UNCTAD Principles on Responsible Sovereign Financing, in: Lastra/Buchheit (eds.), Sovereign Debt Management, 2014, 27.01 ff.

(26) On this Paulus, What Constitutes a Debt in the Sovereign Debt Restructuring Context?, in Ligustro/Sacerdoti, Liber amicorum in honore di Paolo Picone, 2010, p. 231 ff.

(27) On this, see Horn/Reinhart/Trebesch, China’s Overseas Lending, NBER (National Bureau of Economic Research) Working Paper Series no. 26050, 2019, available at: https://www.nber.org/papers/w26050. But also Hurley/Morris/Portelance, Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective, CGD Policy Paper 121 from March 2018, available at: https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/examining-debt-implications-belt-and-road-initiative-policy-perspective.pdf.

(28) This is irrespective of that China is imposing interest rates close to commercial activities, Cf. Horn/Reinhart/Trebesch (previous fn), p. 21.

(29) Just see ICJ Rep. 1950, S. 4 (8): “If the relevant words in their natural and ordinary meaning make sense in their context, that is an end of the matter”. But see, for instance, Heintschel von Heinegg in Ipsen, Völkerrecht, 6th ed. 2014, p. 407 ff.

(30) Cf., for instance, BGH from 6.10.2016 – I ZB 13/15, Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 2017, 128 marg. No. 25 f. with a note by Fölsing.

(31) It has not even its own website.

(32) On both Clubs see also Mazzoni/Malaguti, Diritto del Commercio Internazionale – Fondamenti e prospettive, 2019, p. 78 f.

(33) A difference exists insofar as the London Club has no fixed membership.

(34) Cf. Hanisch, Bemerkungen zur Geschichte des internationalen Insolvenzrechts, Festschrift für F.Merz, 1992, p. 159 ff.

(35) On what follows, Cf., e.g., Paulus, The Interrelationship of Sovereign Debt and Distressed Banks: A European Perspective, 49 Texas International Law Journal 200 ff. (2014). See additionally, e.g., Rehm, Die Verstrickung von Bankindustrie und öffentlichem Sektor – wie kann der gordische Knoten durchschlagen werden?, ZVerglRWiss 113, 2014, 586 ff.

(36) On him, Cf. Drelichman/Voth, The Sustainable Debts of Philipp II: A reconstruction of Spain’s fiscal position 1560-1598, available at: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/cromer/e211_f07/voth.pdf; Álvarez-Nogales/Chamley, Debt Policy Under Constraints: Philip II, the Cortes, and Genoese Bankers, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2379787; De Carlos Morales, Felipe II: el Imperio en Bancarotta, 2008.

(37) On this “double-role” and its implicit conflict of interests Cf. Hauser, Die Privilegierung staatlicher Schuldner, 2018, p. 39 ff.

(38) For the Eurozone, insofar art. 114 par. 4 CRR is of fundamental importance. It is essential for what is commonly called the banks’ “home bias”, Cf. Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW), Wochenbericht 49/2018, p. 1046 (https://www.diw.de/documents/publikationen/73/diw_01.c.608697.de/18-49-1.pdf).

(39) In some countries such a curtailment might reduce the state’s indebtedness by almost 1%!

(40) Cf. Recital 13 of the ESM-Treaty.

(41) See, e.g., Stockman, Default, Reputation and Balanced-Budget Rules, 7:2 Review of Economic Dynamics, 2004, p. 382 ff.; Herman, Introduction: The Players and the Game of Sovereign Debt, 21 Ethics & International Affairs (2007), p. 5 ff.; Lienau, Rethinking Sovereign Debt, 2014, p. 1 ff.; Weidenmeier, Gunboats, Reputation, and Sovereign Repayment: Lessons from the Southern Confederacy, 2004), available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=633621.

(42) Cf. Wollner, Morally Bankrupt: International Financial Governance and the Ethics of Sovereign Default, 26 J. of Polit. Philosophy 2018, p. 344, 345.

(43) Cf. Buckley, The Bankruptcy of Nations: An Idea Whose Time has Come, 43 The International Lawyer, 2009, p. 1189 ff. On a state’s objection of necessity (deutsches) Bundesverfassungsgericht, dec. from 8 May 2007 – 2 BvM 1/03, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift (NJW) 2007, 2610 ff. with Reinisch, Sachverständigengutachten zur Frage des Bestehens und der Wirkung des völkerrechtlichen Rechtfertigungsgrundes “Staatsnotstand”, 68 Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV), 2008, p. 3 ff.; Mayer, Staateninsolvenz nach dem Argentinien-Beschluss des Bundesverfassungsgerichts – Eine Chance für den Finanzplatz Deutschland?, Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Bankrecht (WM) 2008, 425 ff.; Rudolf/Hüfken, Note in: 101 Am. Journal of Intl.L., 2007, p. 857 ff.

(44) From a policy perspective Cf. Bergthaler/Kang/Liu/Monaghan, Tackling Small and Medium Sized Enterprise Problem Loans in Europe, IMF Staff Discussion Note from March 30, 2015.

(45) Pursuant to the ICSID decision in the case Abaclat and Others v. Argentina, ICSID Arbitral Tribunal 4.8.2011, Case No. ARB/07/5 (available at: https://www.italaw.com/cases/35) the purchase of sovereign bonds constitutes an investment. Generally, on the use of arbitration in this context Waibel, Opening Pandora’s Box: Sovereign Bonds in International Arbitration, 101 The American J.of Intl.L. 2007, p. 711 ff.; Halverson Cross, Sovereign Arbitration, in Lastra/Buchheit (eds.), Sovereign Debt Management, 2014, 12.01 ff.

(46) For a historical overview, Cf. Reinhart/Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly, 2009; Waibel, Sovereign Defaults Before International Courts and Tribunals, 2011, p. 3 ff.; Das / Papaioannou / Trebesch, Sovereign Debt Restructurings 1950-2010: literature survey, IMF Working Paper from August 2012, available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12203.pdf; Rogoff/Zettelmeyer, Bankruptcy Procedures for Sovereigns: A History of Ideas, 1976-2001, IMF Staff Papers 49 No.3, 2002, available at: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/staffp/2002/03/pdf/rogoff.pdf. See also (without author): “Sovereign Defaults and Debt Restructurings: Historical Overview”, available at: http://journalistsresource.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/12/MIT-Press_Sovereign-Defaults-and-Debt-Restructurings.pdf.

(47) Cf. Heimbeck, Die Abwicklung von Staatsbankrotten im Völkerrecht – Verrechtlichung und Rechtsvermeidung zwischen 1824 und 1907, 2013, p. 167 ff.

(48) Highly informative (for the 19th century) Heimbeck, Die Abwicklung von Staatsbankrotten im Völkerrecht – Verrechtlichung und Rechtsvermeidung zwischen 1824 und 1907, 2013, p. 23 ff., 63 ff.

(49) Abkommen über deutsche Auslandsschulden, London, den 27.2.1953, BGBl. II, S. 333 (transformed by Gesetz betr. das Abkommen vom 27.Februar 1953 über deutsche Auslandsschulden vom 24.8.1953, BGBl. II, p. 331); on this Abs, Entscheidungen 1949 – 1953: Die Entstehung des “Londoner Schuldenabkommens”, 1991. Additionally, Monatsbericht 02.2003 des Bundesministerium der Finanzen, p. 91 ff.: 27. Februar 2003 – 50 Jahre Londoner Schuldenabkommen; Kaiser, One Made it Out of the Debt Trap, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, International Policy Analysis, available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/iez/10137.pdf.

(50) On the attempt to establish creditors’ committees Cf. Buchheit, The Use of Creditor Committees in Sovereign Debt Workouts (on file with the present author).

(51) Just see Raffer, Applying Chapter 9 Insolvency to International Debts: An Economically Efficient Solution with a Human Face’, World Development 18(2), 1990, p. 301 ff.; idem, Internationalizing US Municipal Insolvency: A Fair, Equitable, and Efficient Way to Overcome a Debt Overhang, Chicago Journal of International Law 2005, p. 361 ff.

(52) On the Jubilee Year and its christian re-activation by Pope Bonifatius VIII. in the year 1300 (Bulle: Antiquorum habet fida relatio) Cf. Thurston, Holy Year of the Jubilee, in: Herbermann (ed.), The Catholic Encyclopedia (1907–1912), Vol. 7, available at: https://archive.org/details/holyyearofjubile00thur. Its historical roots reach deep into history, down to Mesopotamia, Cf. Scheuermann (sed.), Das Jobeljahr im Wandel (2000); an extensive historical and theological interpretation is to be found at Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran (2007); but see also A.Michel (Hg.), Èthique du Jubilé – vers une réparation du monde?, 2005.

(53) On this, just see Krueger, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, International Monetary Fund 2002; Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 Geo. J Int’s L. 299 ff. (2005). Opposing Taylor, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A U.S. Perspective, 2002, available at: https://www.piie.com/commentary/speeches-papers/sovereign-debt-restructuring-us-perspective.

(54) Cf. Paulus, A Statutory Procedure for Restructuring Debts of Sovereign States, Recht der Internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 2003, p. 401 ff. (in Portuguese: Processo Jurídico de Insolvencia Estatal, Rev. Ibero-Americana de Direito Público X, 2003, p. 65 ff.

(55) On them just see Bauer/Cahn/Kenadjian (eds.), Collective Action Clauses and the Restructuring of Sovereign Debt, 2013; Bradley/Gulati, Collective Action Clauses for the Eurozone: An Empirical Analysis, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1948534; Hofmann/Keller, Collective Action Clauses, Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) 175 (2011), 684 et seq.; Weidemeier / Gulati, A People’s History of Collective Action Clauses, available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2172302.

(56) Cf. supra at fn. 23.

(57) A plea for extension at Paulus/Tirado, Sweet and Lowdown: A Resolvency Process and the Eurozone’s Crisis Management Framework, Law and Economics Yearly Review 2013, S. 504 ff. (= http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2330423.

(58) On the pari passu principle Chabot/Gulati, Santa Anna and his Black Eagle: The Origins of Pari Passu, 2014, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/results.cfm; Affaki, Revisiting the Pari Passu Clause, in: Lastra/Buchheit (eds.), Sovereign Debt Management, 2014, 4.01 ff.

(59) Some of them are listed in: IMF, Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Recent Developments and Implication for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework, 26 April 2013, available at: https://de.scribd.com/document/143751399/IMF-SDR. See, moreover, Schwarcz, “Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 Emory L.J. 2004, p. 1189 ff.; Malaguti, Sovereign Insolvency and International Legal Order, 11 Intl. Community L.R. 2009, p. 307 ff.; Gianviti/Krueger/Pisani-Ferry/Sapir/von Hagen, A European Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Proposal, from 9 Nov. 2010; available at: https://www.bruegel.org/2010/11/a-european-mechanism-for-sovereign-debt-crisis-resolution-a-proposal/. S. also infra fn. 84.

(60) In 2016, available at: https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/69/319; on these principles Cf. Guzman / Stieglitz, A soft Law Mechanism for Sovereign Debt Restructuring, FES – international policy analysis Oct. 2016; Paulus, Schritte auf einem Weg zu einem Resolvenzrecht für zahlungsunfähige Staaten, WM 2015, 953 ff. See additionally from the International Institute of Finance (IIF) Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring, available at: https://www.iif.com/system/files/2013_IIF_PCG_Report_3.pdf.

(61) Cf. supra at fn. 25.

(62) On these European CACs just see Seitz, Umschuldungsklauseln (Collective Action Clauses) in Staatsanleihen des europäischen Währungsraums, 2014.

(63) On this principle, e.g., Wollner, Morally Bankrupt: International Financial Governance and the Ethics of Sovereign Default, 26 J. of Polit. Philosophy 2018, p. 344, 347 – advocating in this article that this principle should be adjusted in the realm of sovereign lending and borrowing.

(64) On both, hold-outs and vultures, just see Paulus/van den Busch, Von Ausharrenden und Geiern, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM) 2014, p. 2015 ff.

(65) Cf. Frieda, Sovereign Debt Markets, in: Lastra/Buchheit (eds.), Sovereign Debt Management, 2014, 20.01 ff.

(66) On the notorious case NML, Inc. vs. Argentina Audit, Sovereign Bonds and National Relativism: Can New York Law Contracts Safely Cross the Atlantic?, 2014, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2396856; Paulus, Schritte auf einem Weg zu einem Resolvenzrecht für zahlungsunfähige Staaten, Wertpapier-Mitteilungen (WM) 2015, 953 ff.; idem, Zwischenetappen des Resolvenzrechts, Recht der internationalen Wirtschaft (RIW) 2016, 93 ff.; Buchheit/Gulati, Restructuring Sovereign Debt After NML v. Argentina, 2017, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2820444. See also Schumacher/Trebesch/Enderlein, Sovereign defaults in court. The rise of creditor litigation, 2018, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2189997.

(67) On Belgium’s fight against vultures Cf. Wozny, National Anti-Vulture Funds Legislation: Belgium’s Turn, 2 Columbia Business L.R. (2017), p. 697 ff.; Paulus, Geierfonds vor Gericht ausbremsen?, Zeitschrift für Rechtpolitik (ZRP) 2016, 146 ff.

(68) Sovereign Debt Restructuring – Recent Developments and Implication for the Fund’s Legal and Policy Framework, 26 April 2013, available at: https://de.scribd.com/document/143751399/IMF-SDR.

(69) On what follows Cf. Buchheit/Gulati, The Argentine Collective Action Clause Controversy, available at: https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3656833.

(70) See also, at around this time, Paulus, Überlegungen zu einem Insolvenzverfahren für Staaten, WM 2002, 725 ff.

(71) On further attempts of the IMF on debt relief see, e.g., Berensmann, How to Prevent and Resolve Debt Crises in LICs?, Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (d.i.e.) Discussion Paper 1/2010, p. 37 ff.

(72) Cf. https://www.bis.org/publ/gten08.pdf.

(73) Ibid. (fn.65), p.4.

(74) The European ESM Treaty (see above at fn. 18) CACs may have a double limb voting requirement with the (remarkably low) thresholds of 662/3% and 50%. From 1 Jan. 2022 on, however, this shall be replaced by a single limb voting; on that, see below in the text, Cf. Recital 11 and art. 12 par. 3, 2nd sent. of the revised Treaty, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/634357/IPOL_IDA%282019%29634357_EN.pdf.

(75) On this and the so-called “Pacman strategy” of Argentina Cf. Buchheit/Gulati (as in fn. 69), p. 7 ff.

(76) A first attempt was made in the context of the latest Ecuadorian restructuring (2020), Cf. Clark/Lyratzakis, Towards a More Robust Sovereign Debt Restructuring Architecture: Innovations from Ecuador and Argentina, 16 Capital Markets L.J. (2021), p. 31 ff.

(77) Cf. Paulus (fn. 23).

(78) Cf. only recently IMF, The International Architecture for Resolving Sovereign Debt involving Private-Sector Creditors – Recent Developments, Challenges, and Reform Options, from September 23, 2020, available at: file:///Users/cgp1000/Downloads/PPEA2020043-1.pdf. See also Weder di Mauro/Zettelmeyer, The New Global Financial Safety Net: Struggling for Coherent Governance in a Multipolar System, CIGI – Essays on International Finance vol. 4, Jan. 2017, p. 33 ff.; Rossi, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Debt Mutualisation in the Euro Area: An Assessment, from May 2019, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/634396/IPOL_IDA%282019%29634396_EN.pdf.

(79) On this, just see Mazzoni/Malaguti, Diritto del Commercio Internazionale – Fondamenti e prospettive, 2019.

(80) But see Hagan, Debt Restructuring and Economic Recovery, in: Lastra/Buchheit (eds.), Sovereign Debt Management, 2014, 23.01 ff.

(81) As one out of many other examples Cf. Malaguti, Sovereign Debt Restructuring and Protection of Creditors in the European Union through the Lenses of Most Recent Case Law, Festschrift für Herbert Kronke, 2020, p. 329 ff

(82) Some indications are to be found in the collection of presentations in: Mauro/Pernazza (eds.), Il debito sovrano tra tutela del credito e salvaguardia della funzione dello stato, 2014.

(83) See also Wollner, Morally Bankrupt: International Financial Governance and the Ethics of Sovereign Default, 26 J. of Polit. Philosophy 2018, p. 344 ff.

(84) On a resolvency proceeding, just see Paulus, A Resolvency Proceeding for Defaulting Sovereigns, 24 Norton Journal of Bankruptcy Law and Practice 2015, 376 ff.; idem, Un procedimiento da “resolvencia” para Grecia:?Habría funcionado?, in: Martín/Tirado (eds.), Grecia: aspectos políticos y jurídico-economícos de la crisis, 2015, p. 279 ff.; idem, Taugt das Insolvenzrecht als Vorlage für ein Staaten-Resolvenzrecht?, Zeitschrift für Internationales Wirtschaftsrecht (IWRZ) 2017, 99 ff.; idem, Warum benötigen wir ein Resolvenzverfahren?, ZIP 2019, 637 ff. See also Reinisch, The Need for an International Insolvency Procedure, Österreichisches Bankarchiv (ÖBA) 1994, 115 ff.

(85) The internal creditors of a state are left out here; primarily in times of war, the domestic population might frequently function as creditors, see, e.g., the decision of the German Reichsgericht from 1924, RGZ 108, 298 ff., with Paulus, The Evolution of the “Concept of Odious Debts”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht (ZaöRV) 68, 2008, 391, 397. The literature on odious debts is endless, just see Schneider, Odious Debts, 2014; Wong, Sovereign Finance and the Poverty of Nations – Odious Debts in International Law, 2012; Buchheit, Law, Ethics, and International Finance, 70:3 Law & Contemporary Problems (2007), p. 1 ff.; Buchheit / Gulati / Thompson, The Dilemma of Odious Debts, 56 Duke L.J., 2007, p. 1201 ff.; Ochoa, From Odious Debt to Odious Finance: Avoiding the Externalities of a Functional Odious Debt Doctrine, 49:1 Harvard Intl.L.J. 2008, p. 109 ff.; Choi/Posner, A Critique of the Odious Debt Doctrine, U. Virginia Law School: Public Law and Legal Theory Working paper Series 2007, no. 58.